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ABSTRACT 
KNOWLEDGE AS CONVERSATION: RICHARD RORTY 
AND THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM 
Patrick B. Smith 
This thesis examines the place of philosopher Richard Rorty in the American 
pragmatist tradition. To locate him within this rich tradition, I outline the major tenets of 
classical pragmatism that constitute the core aims of the early pragmatists-Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. These three figures are examined 
thoroughly to identifY the consistencies and inconsistencies in their individual pragmatist 
doctrines and to define the context in which pragmatism was born. This examination 
serves as the jumping offpoint for the central portion of the thesis: Richard Rorty and the 
revival 0 f American pragmatism during the 1980s. 
Rorty's place within the pragmatist tradition is highly contentious. With the 
publication of Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (1979), Rorty successfully brought 
American pragmatism back into academic discourses after a moribund period lasting 
almost thirty years. However, many scholars question his pragmatist credentials, arguing 
that Rorty's philosophy resembles a number of traits consistent with postmodemism. 
Against this charge, I argue that Rorty can appropriately be classified as a pragmatist and 
that he deserves a place within the tradition. Although Rortyian pragmatism maintains 
several differences with respect to the philosophy of the early pragmatists, these 
differences represent historically-contingent refinements to the classical tradition. That is, 
Rorty has employed a number of conceptual tools unavailable to the early pragmatists to 
clear up some of the more problematic assertions made by the early group. Moreover, 
v 
when his background is pressed by historical inquiry, a picture emerges of Rorty that 
illustrates a lifelong commitment to pragmatism and pragmatist doctrines. Furthermore, I 
argue that the pluralism that is implicit in pragmatist doctrines warrants Rorty's 
membership in the tradition. Taken together, I conclude that Rorty can appropriately be 
called a pragmatist and he represents a valuable voice in a contemporary world that is 
facing unprecedented growth, .environmental destruction, and the inevitability of 
continued interconnectedness. Although the face of his pragmatism is different, it still 
maintains enough family resemblances to qualify as such. 
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The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything 
fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the 
beautiful itself. .As for those who in each case embrace the thing itself, we must call them 
philosophers, not lovers ofopinion? Most definitely. -Plato, The Republic 
The very idea of being presented with "all of Truth" is absurd, because the Platonic 
notion ofTruth itself is absurd. -Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o/Nature 
INTRODUCTION
Richard Rorty, philosopher and culture critic, lived a seditious existence. His pragmatic 
commitment to epistemological antifoundationalism, his willingness to take the 
'linguistic tum,' and his denigration of programmatic philosophy, have all made him a 
frequent target of attack in the academic community over the last thirty years. l Whereas 
some scholars shirk away from criticism, Rorty courts controversy. In his 
autobiographical essay "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," Rorty describes his precarious 
standing in academic circles: "If there is anything to the idea that the best intellectual 
position is one which is attacked with equal vigor from the political right and the political 
left, then I am in good shape."z Rorty's unflinching tenacity and restless challenging of 
the accepted notion of philosophy in academics and culture make him most effervescent 
and instructive. 
This essay proposes several goals. Pragmatism as an intellectual doctrine has been 
fiercely debated from the nineteenth-century to the present. The first goal, then, will be to 
examine the historiographical debate over the meaning and function of the term 
"pragmatism." Second, I will examine the historical context 0 f pragmatism's birth. This 
contextual analysis will serve to introduce the pragmatism of the ''big three": Peirce, 
I Richard Rorty's critics number in the dozens, ifnot tens of dozens. For some of the more lively 
criticisms passed down on Rorty, see Susan Haack, "Vulgar Rortyism," in The New Criterion 16, no. 3 
(1997); Barry Allen, "What is Epistemology?", and John McDowell, "Toward Rehabilitating Objectivity," 
in Rorty and His Critics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000); Richard Shusterman, "Dewey on Experience: 
Foundation or Reconstruction?" in Dewey Recorifigured: Essays on Deweyan Pragmatism, Casey Haskins 
and David Seiple, eds. (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1999); James Campbell, "Rorty's Use of Dewey," in The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1994); Thomas M. Alexander, "Richard Rorty and Dewey's 
Metaphysics of Experience," in Southwest Philosophical Studies 5 (1980). For an illustrative representation 
of Rorty's dissatisfaction with programmatic philosophy, namely Analytic philosophy, see Richard Rorty, 
"Thomas Kuhn, Rocks, and the Laws of Physics," in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin 
Books, 1999), 175-189. 
2 Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 3. 
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James, and Dewey. Moreover, the analysis of the early pragmatists will illustrate the 
difficulty in pinning down a single, unifYing theme to describe pragmatism. 
Consistencies among these men were matched equally by sharp inconsistencies, but some 
continuity can be located. Third, I will examine the nature of the revival ofpragmatism in 
America during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In so doing, I will explore Rorty's role as 
the central figure in the revival and how he successfully brought pragmatism back into 
academic discourse. This analysis will serve as the jumping off point for the central 
discussion ofthis thesis. 
To this end, I argue that Rorty's self-designation as a pragmatist was the result of 
biographical predispositions, philosophical commitments, and intellectual misgivings 
with analytic philosophy during the 1960s and 70s. Early in his career, Rorty attained 
professional notoriety by taking the "pragmatist tum" and leaving analytic philosophy 
behind. This involved developing a unique brand of pragmatism that abandoned 
experience in favor oflinguistics as the primary medium in which knowledge is acquired. 
To some, the fast and loose approach he employs in his historical reinterpretation distorts 
the history of pragmatism, and, as a result, created a polemical debate over the legacy of 
pragmatism that continues today. 
For many observers, Rorty's self-identification with the pragmatist tradition is 
little more than an attempt to corroborate his own philosophical positions that grew out of 
his dissatisfaction with analytic philosophy during the mid-1960s and early 1970s. They 
see Rorty's "conversion," as exampled in the "pragmatist tum," as disingenuous and 
ultimately wrongheaded. For my purposes here, I will argue that this reductive account 
fails to recognize the multifarious and nuanced background of Rorty's intellectual 
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development. If certain aspects of Rorty's background are brought to light, then his 
"pragmatist tum" appears to be less a conversion and more of a manifestation of his 
intellectual development. 
Rorty's tum to linguistics as the basis of his philosophy is understandingly 
problematic to some scholars of classical pragmatism. However, I argue that it should be 
seen as a valid epistemological move. Rorty is thinking and writing in a post-Kuhnian 
intellectual setting that requires a rethinking of the utility of epistemology on the whole. 
As a result, his pragmatism is going to look quite different than the pragmatism of the 
early group. Furthermore, I believe that Rorty's socio-linguistic epistemology avoids 
many of the pitfalls several postmodemists confront in their own formulations. Unlike 
many ofthe postmodemists who view deconstruction as an end in itself, Rorty is never so 
jaded as to not leave his audience with a sense of hope (however fleeting and laced with 
contingency) about the possibilities ofthe individual and society. 
The hope in writing this thesis is to somehow provide a rationale for moving 
beyond the Rorty-Pragmatism controversy. By showing how Rorty's background is shot 
through with genuine pragmatist concerns and how his philosophy shares many of the 
"family resemblances" of his forefathers, I hope to offer justification for his inclusion in 
this rich tradition. As for the tradition itself, I will argue that pragmatism is large, yet 
specific enough, to allow Rorty membership. In so doing, I conclude that the time has 
come to move beyond the controversy surrounding Rorty and move toward reinforcing 
the central tenets of the pragmatism that allow Rorty to appropriately call himself a 
pragmatist. To do so, we must rediscover the early pragmatist's emphasis on pluralism, 
historicism, and possibility. 
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CHAPTER I 
WHAT IS PRAGMATISM, ANYWAY? 
Sources ofAmbiguity 
"Pragmatism" as a common, everyday term arouses a variety of meanings. To the 
common person, it evokes a sense of the American identity: historically, Americans have 
always made pragmatic choices that effect practical consequences. In this usage, 
pragmatism describes the American ethos as being one marked by practicality, where 
hard work and simple ingenuity are the mechanisms ofprogress and democracy.3 
For academics, defining pragmatism is slightly trickier. Pragmatism can connote 
many things: a brand of philosophical inquiry specific to American universities; a 
methodological approach for solving problems in the sciences and humanities; a term 
used by intellectual historians to describe a particular idea at a particular moment in 
American history; and so on. The multitude of meanings prescribed to the term is 
indicative of the difficulty of tying down pragmatism. The major implication of 
ambiguity over meaning is that pragmatism can be viewed as a totally incoherent, and 
thus useless, philosophical doctrine. As an indirect result of this, it becomes unclear who 
counts as a pragmatist, and in contemporary discourse, who is actually preserving the 
mantle ofclassical pragmatism. 
3 One of the most outspoken critics of pragmatism during the first years of the twentieth-century 
was historian Lewis Mumford. In The Golden Day (1926), Mumford chastised the common perception of 
pragmatism as the primary feature of the American identity. For Mumford, pragmatism did not represent an 
attitude of simple ingenuity, progress, and democracy. He argued that this assessment lacked a sense of 
tragedy in a United States that was witnessing the manifestations of industrialization and still reeling from 
the Civil War. Mumford saw pragmatism not as a philosophy ofaction and progress, but as a philosophy of 
acquiescence. Mumford observes that "Transcendentalism, as Emerson caustically said, had resulted in a 
headache; but the pragmatism that followed it was a paralysis." See Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day: A 
Study in American Experience and Culture (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926), 166. 
5 
Although the problem of ambiguity abounds, it follows that a highly generalized 
definition can be agreed upon by most observers. Most would agree that, as an academic 
discourse, pragmatism emphasizes the practical consequences of philosophical and 
scientific forms of inquiry. It is generally accepted that pragmatism deals mainly with the 
"practicalization of truth," the "practicalization of intelligence," and the utility of 
epistemology.4 However, as in most cases, problems are to be found in the details. 
Ambiguities and contradictions arise when the particulars of large, generally accepted 
definitions are scrutinized. Many scholars have attempted to locate the sources of 
ambiguity and clarify the pragmatists' project over the past century. In so doing, many 
have been critical without constructiveness, while others attempt therapeutic treatment of 
the beleaguered term. 
American philosopher and intellectual historian Arthur Lovejoy was one of the 
flfSt critics to point out the ambiguities and inconsistencies of pragmatism. In 1908, 
Lovejoy published the two-part article "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" in which he outlines 
the varied meanings 0 f pragmatism as .a philosophical doctrine. In so doing, he 
emphasizes that deficiencies abound because of a lack of doctrinal coherence. Lovejoy 
attributes the lack of coherence to the large amalgamation of pragmatic practitioners: 
''There appears to be as yet no sufficient clear and general recognition, among 
contributors to that controversy, of the fact that the pragmatist is not merely three, but 
4 A dialogue occurred between John Dewey and William Pepperell Montague at a 1939 American 
Philosophical Association meeting, in which Montague complimented Dewey "for his lifelong effort to 
practicalize intelligence." It is reported that Dewey replied "that Montague was taking a narrow, inbred 
view-a philosopher's trade-union view, he implied-of what he, Dewey, had tried to accomplish. His 
effort had not been to practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice." See Charles Frankel, "John 
Dewey's Social Philosophy," in New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Steven M. Cahn 
(Hanover, NH: University Press ofNew England, 1977), 5. 
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many men at once."s He argues that the variety ofpragmatisms and pragmatists leads to 
doctrinal confusion and incommensurability between the competing definitions. He 
attributes the problem of defmition to two causes: "The multiplicity of meanings in 
pragmatism is partly explicit and partly implicit; that is to say, it is due to the conjunction 
by the representatives of pragmatism of contentions which they themselves express by 
separate formulas; and it is partly due to the unrecognized ambiguities of meaning or 
duplicates of implication latent in one.or another of these formulas.,,6 He concludes that 
"what the movement commonly so named most needs is a clarification of its formulas 
and a discrimination of certain sound and important ideas lying behind it from certain 
other ideas that are sound but not important, and certain that would be important if only 
they were not unsound.,,7 This, though, is easier said than done. 
Half a century later, H.S. Thayer attempted to resolve some of Lovejoy's 
concerns.8 Just as Lovejoy saw different pragmatisms owing to different pragmatists, 
Thayer too sees the difficulty of defmition related to multiple actors in the early 
pragmatist movement. Although many intellectual movements are coherent with many 
actors and adherents, the lack of a clear understanding over doctrine among pragmatists 
served to exacerbate ambiguity. He observes that "it is odd that the founders of 
pragmatism were neither clear nor consistent in the accounts they gave concerning the 
historical origins oftheir doctrines." Thayer attributes this confusion to the fact that ''they 
5 Arthur o. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I.," in The Journal ofPhilosophy, Psychology 
and Scientific Method 5, no. 1 (2 January 1908): 5. 
6 Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I," 5-6. 
7 Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms. IL," in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Method 5, no. 2 (16 January 1908): 38-39. 
8 H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History ofPragmatism (New York: The Bobbs­
Merrill Company, 1968). Garry Brodsky observes that this foundational text created the "orthodox 
interpretation of American pragmatism." See Brodsky, "Rorty's Interpretation of Pragmatism," in 
Transactions ofthe Charles Sanders Peirce Society 17 (1982): 311-38, at 322. 
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were not entirely in agreement on what pragmatism stood for, as a philosophic position or 
as a nucleus of ideas.,,9 It may be said, then, that ambiguity is a symptom of something 
inherent in the nature ofpragmatism that makes it difficult to pin down, for good and ill. 
Thayer sees the conflation of "pragmatism" and ''usefulness'' as another source of 
ambiguity. He argues the general line espouses that "pragmatism is a doctrine holding 
that the meaning and truth of thought is determined (somehow) by criteria of practical 
usefulness. Some of the colloquial and uncritical language of the leading pragmatists 
would seem to support this generalization.,,10 Thayer believes that the coupling of 
"pragmatism" with ''usefulness'' creates confusion for several reasons. First, it makes it 
seem that the notion of utility was a novel feature of early pragmatism. Against this 
common view, Thayer believes that the doctrine of usefulness has been written time and 
time again in the history of Western philosophy. After all, the subtitle of James's 
Pragmatism is "a new name for some old ways of thinking." Second, the notion of 
usefulness is subjective to the individual. Indeed, what is useful for one person may be 
dangerous or harmful to another. On this charge, pragmatism is branded as subjectivism 
or relativism which serves to confuse its actual meaning. In sum, the characteristic of 
utility takes pragmatism in directions it is not necessarily meant to go. 
In similar fashion, John E. Smith argues that ambiguity over the meaning of 
pragmatism results from internal inconsistencies and external hostilities by philosophers 
who viewed pragmatism as reckless and naive. Of the former, Smith observes that 
James's ''vivid imagination and arresting language" lead ultimately to formulating 
9 Thayer, 5.
10 Ibid., 5-6. Author's emphasis.
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"expressions that were misleading or designed to confirm the prejudices of his critics.,,11 
In Peirce, he identifies "cryptic forms of expression which multiply the problems of 
interpretation." Also, in Dewey he observes the ''tendency to spin an almost impenetrable 
web about an idea or distinction which calls instead for special clarification does not 
make him easy to read.,,12 
To the latter, Smith notes that critics of pragmatism carry a certain amount of 
responsibility for misunderstandings and misinterpretations. He argues that hostility over 
the methods and implications of pragmatism has led critics to false interpretations and 
prejudices against pragmatism. Smith writes that ''the idea of connecting thought with 
practical consequences and with the transforming of situations through an instrumental 
intelligence was taken to be a sure sign that thought had been deprived of its autonomy 
and that the essential message of Pragmatism could be summed up in the formula 'All 
thought is for the sake of action. ",13 Critics also routinely portray pragmatism as a 
borrowed tradition with "intellectual capital from the Old World.,,14 According to 
interpretations of this sort, pragmatism is too behaviorist and unoriginal. Taken on the 
whole, then, Smith concludes that ambiguity results from both internal and external 
causes. 
Others argue that confusion begins with the historians' perception of American 
pragmatism. They argue that lumping Peirce, James, and Dewey into something that 
II John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 7. 
12 Smith, Meaning and Purpose, 8. Smith cites Peirce's pragmatic maxim-with its reference to 
effects which 'might conceivably have practical bearings'-as muddled, and Dewey's use of the term 
'doubtful' to describe a situation prone to problems as key examples of the pragmatists' ambiguity and 
unclear vocabularies. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 John E. Smith, The Spirit ofAmerican Philosophy, Revised Edition (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
1983), xi. 
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resembles a unified movement distorts the historical facts. In Community Denied: The 
Wrong Turn ofPragmatic Liberalism, historian James Hoopes argues that there was no 
single, unified "pragmatism". Against the common perception of a cohesive body that 
constituted American pragmatism, Hoopes asserts that ''there were two very different 
American pragmatisms, a Peircean strain and a James-Dewey strain, the latter being what 
most intellectual historians have in mind when they invoke 'American Pragmatism.",15 
For Hoopes, Peirce is "lumped" in with James and Dewey because of his initial role in 
the creation of pragmatism. This coupling forgets that ''there were real and specific 
differences in logic and metaphysics between Peirce on the one hand and James and 
Dewey on the other. Where Peirce's pragmatism was strong and objective, theirs was 
weak, was at least partly subjective and unpragmatic.,,16 
Taken on the whole, the muddled view ofpragmatism can be seen as the result of 
internal and external sources; inconsistencies and ambiguities are the consequence of 
vagueness on the part of the pragmatist philosophers, its critics, and historians. 
Ambiguity, though, does not render pragmatism completely incoherent. 
What Pragmatism Is 
As shown above, inconsistencies and ambiguities within pragmatist doctrines were 
recognized by both pragmatists and their critics. Indeed, after James "borrowed" Peirce's 
maxim of pragmatism and expanded its scope to include questions of religion and 
morality, Peirce protested vigorously. As Thayer observes, "Peirce's "maxim," as he 
called his method of analysis, became James's universal "mission"...Peirce's laboratory, 
15 James Hoopes, Community Denied: The Wrong Turn of Pragmatic Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998),2. 
16 Ibid., 2-3. 
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then, was rebuilt into a hotel by James... ,,17 This, of course, led Peirce to rename his 
philosophical approach "pragmaticism", a term ''which is ugly enough to be safe from 
kidnappers.,,18 Dewey developed pragmatism further from Peirce's unclear "maxim" and 
James's theory of meaning towards an instrumentalist theory of inquiry. 19 Thus, the 
critical observation that pragmatism is an inconsistent philosophical doctrine is not 
without substance. However, the variances in pragmatism among Peirce, James, and 
Dewey do not render pragmatism totally unintelligible and incoherent as a mode of 
inquiry or as a philosophical doctrine. 
What follows is a brief sketch of the unifying themes of pragmatism. After this 
brief sketch, the question of whether or not pragmatism can be treated as a coherent 
doctrine will be examined. Pragmatism is a philosophical genre concerned with forms of 
inquiry and the practical consequences of knowledge. James argues that ''the whole 
function ofphilosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you 
and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the 
true one.,,20 James gives voice to an important reoccurring characteristic of pragmatism: 
an obsession with outcomes, consequences, practicality, and utility ofknowledge and the 
methods used to derive such knowledge. 
17 Thayer, Meaning and Action, 80. 
18 Charles Sanders Peirce, Values in a Universe of Chance: Charles Sanders Peirce, Selected 
Writings, ed. Philip Wiener (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 186. 
19 Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is a treatise that outlines his concern with methods of 
inquiry (mainly scientific) and their practical consequences in human affairs. Dewey's "instrumentalism" is 
his own formulation of a distinct method of inquiry: knowledge gained from inquiry should have an 
instrumental value or character for it to be worthwhile. For a method of inquiry to be instrumental, it must 
have aims that are directed at knowledge with practical consequences. See Dewey, Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1938). 
20 William James, "What Pragmatism Means," in The Writings of William James, John 1. 
McDermott, ed. (Chicago and London: The University ofChicago Press, 1977),379. 
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Often, though, the pragmatist's emphasis on the practical nature of knowledge is 
translated into denunciatory readings of pragmatism that charge it with relativism, 
nominalism, and subjectivism.21 Against these sorts of charges, pragmatists have argued 
that such hostilities are the carryover of an obsolete tradition that still pays homage to 
notions of "first philosophy" and epistemological foundationalism. For pragmatists, it is 
the job of the philosopher to make knowledge functional in the sense that it acts as the 
guide of our actions. In so doing, knowledge is the tool that allows us to get along better 
in the world, make better choices, and inform future choices and decisions. In a word, 
knowledge and thought are purposive, rather than foundationa1. 22 
The instrumentalist character 0 f pragmatism's epistemo10gical perspective is the 
manifestation of the pragmatist belief in the transitional nature of reality and human 
existence. On such a view, notions of an objective reality based on assumptions of the 
eternal, the perfect, or simply of foundations of knowledge are simply untenable. If one 
carries such views, the function of knowledge would be to uncover or "discover" such 
foundations. Alternatively, the pragmatic conception of knowledge (with its emphasis on 
the transitional nature of reality and human existence) employs knowledge as a "ruling 
principle" of our actions-hence, pragmatism is inherently instrumentalist in form as it is 
concerned with the outcomes of experiential processes. It is in this experiential process 
that ideas are tested, reinforced, or shown fallible. Thus, knowledge is less a derivative of 
21 The usual target of attack is James's notion ofthe "expediency of truth." In "What Pragmatism 
Means," James states "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and 
good, too, for definite, assignable reasons." (388) Critics of James during his time, and present day 
challengers ofpragmatism cite that this sort oflogic leads to hyper-subjective valuing. However, many are 
quick to defend James's rhetorical usage here as not implying anything of the sort. See Hilary Putnam, 
"The Permanence of William James," in Bulletin of the American Academy ofArts and Sciences 46, no. 3 
(December 1992): 17-31. For an insightful reading of James's rhetorical devices, see Ryan E. Cull, "The 
Betrayal ofPragmatism?: Rorty's Quarrel with James," in Philosophy and Literature 24 (2000): 83-95. 
22 See Thayer, Meaning and Action, 431. 
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experience than it is the guide for experience. Scholars, though, have pressed pragmatists 
on this point. The experientialism that the pragmatists espouse appears to some as an 
updated form ofthe empiricist tradition ofLocke and Berkeley?3 
Common among the early pragmatists is the fundamental importance bestowed 
upon experience. Although Peirce, James, and Dewey all hold widely differing views of 
experience, the epistemological function of experience is the unifying thread that binds 
them each together. On the surface, the emphasis on experience would appear to place 
pragmatism within the larger tradition that began with Locke and Berkeley. The critical 
difference between those commonly identified as the British empiricists and the 
pragmatists is found in the relationship between knowledge and experience. For Locke, 
the epistemological function of experience is to provide the medium for coming to know 
ideas. That is, ideas are derived from experience. For the pragmatists, experience is 
transformed into an epistemological tool for assessing ideas as they are encountered in 
reality. Hence, pragmatists are concerned mainly with the consequences of experience 
and how experience can be used to test a store ofideas.24 
A good general view of pragmatism is H.S. Thayer's Meaning and Action. His cogent 
outline is seen by many scholars as the "orthodox" take on the history of American 
pragmatism. Thayer identifies the "cardinal thesis" of pragmatism to be located in the 
idea ofpossibility. He bases this conclusion on four key premises: first, Peirce, James and 
23 Rorty offers his take on the relationship between pragmatic experientia1ism and the Western 
philosophical tradition in "Truth Without Correspondence to Reality," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 23­
46. He is critical of the weight Peirce and Dewey put behind scientific methods and experience as epistemic 
tools. 
24 See Thayer's chapter entitled "Pragmatism and American Life," in Meaning and Action, 432-47. 
Thayer outlines the imported stock of European ideas in early American philosophy, then goes on to show 
how Peirce, James, and Dewey revised and discarded many of them to produce a distinctly "American" 
form ofphilosophy. 
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Dewey all hold that the character of reality and reason is practical; second, as shown 
above, each of these men believe that existence is transitional and that knowledge is an 
instrument to guide our actions in such a predicament; third, since knowledge is aimed at 
affecting the transitions of reality, knowledge implies valuation; fourth, since thought is a 
process of valuation, knowledge must have an object to which it evaluates. Thus, the 
object ofvaluation, in a pragmatist model as such, is future possibilities that encompass a 
litany ofdesires, interests, and purposes.2s Therefore, since Peirce, James and Dewey are 
concerned with the consequences, not foundations, of knowledge, knowledge and 
thinking should be concerned with the possibilities of the future. 
This thesis represents a radical departure from traditional philosophy. Indeed, 
Dewey ably describes this departure when stating "Pragmatism...presents itself as an 
extension of historical empiricism but with this fundamental difference, that it does not 
insist upon antecedent phenomena but consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents 
but upon the possibilities of action. And this change in point of view is almost 
revolutionary in its consequences.,,26 However, the question becomes: why did a 
paradigm shift occur? If, as Dewey states "this change in point of view is almost 
revolutionary in its consequences," then what historical mechanisms produced this 
change? 
25 Thayer, Meaning and Action, 424-31. 
26 John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," in Philosophy and Civilization 




The Emergence ofAmerican Pragmatism: Social and Historical Contexts 
As outlined above, the early pragmatists all share a common belief in the instrumental 
value of knowledge. Although each approaches epistemological problems with different 
purposes in mind, the unifying theme among them is what Dewey terms "consequent 
phenomena." Experience is the testing ground for ideas: the practical consequences of 
thought are derived from the experimental process of putting ideas to work. In this 
section, the social and historical contexts in which pragmatism emerges will be examined 
with the hope of unearthing the sources of the revolutionary paradigm shift that 
distinguishes pragmatism from its predecessors in the history ofWestem philosophy. 
American philosophy has been denounced as provincial and lacking in intellectual 
originality. However, pragmatism is shot through with paradigm breaking assertions that, 
during its initial years, had consequences and implications both inside the United States 
and abroad. The pragmatist attitude undermines a variety of traditional philosophical 
assumptions. A fIrm commitment existed among the classical pragmatists to the 
challenging offoundationalist epistemologies inherited from the philosophy of Descartes, 
Kant, Spinoza and Leibniz.27 For these philosophers, the goal of philosophy is the 
uncovering of the "foundations" ofknowledge, seeking that which lay behind the cursory 
experiences of the everyday sort. However, Peirce, James, and Dewey see the tenets of 
27 Thayer argues that the pragmatists' challenge to rationalism coincided with attacks against the 
traditions of British empiricism, the tradition most scholars closely associate with pragmatism. See Thayer, 
Meaning andAction, 449-52. 
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fIrst philosophy as obsolete, carrying no bearing on practical matters such as action, 
belief, and social responsibility. Intellectual historian George Cotkin describes the 
concerns ofPeirce with the tradition he inherited: "Peirce dismissed Cartesian rationalism 
based on a priori categories of clarity and distinctness, along with Leibniz's abstract 
defInition of truth...Abstract rationalist defInitions offered little by way of meaning, 
according to Peirce; they were too vague. Inquiry helped the individual to produce belief 
and habit, and most of all to engage in useful discussions oftruth.,,28 It can be seen that 
the early pragmatist's primary concern is with putting knowledge to work to verify belief, 
guide action, and enable the individual to get along better in the world. Several 
interrelated historical events and movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth-
century serve to explain the emergence of pragmatism as undertaken by Peirce, James, 
and Dewey. 
A proper account of the emergence of pragmatism must recognIZe the 
revolutionary impact of Darwin's Origins of Species (1859). This text served to 
undermine not only the authority of religious narratives, but the very concept of self as 
understood in the Western world.29 Darwin's thesis is well known: the origins of species 
(man being one of them) are best explained by historical modification. Through a long 
and slow process of natural selection, species evolve into different forms in conformity 
with the dictates of their environment. On this model, the form that humans embody is 
28 George Cotkin, Reluctant Modernism: American Thought and Culture, 1880-1900 (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1992),42-3. 
29 For an insightful intellectual history that examines some of the impacts of Darwinism in New 
England consciousness, see James Hoopes, Consciousness in New England: From Puritanism to 
Psychoanalysis and Semiotic (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). For a seminal 
work on the history of American philosophy during the period of the Darwinian Revolution, see Bruce 
Kuklick, The Rise ofAmerican Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1977). For a sweeping, yet concise history of ideas in nineteenth century America, see 
Louis Menand's The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 2001). 
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the result of struggle and adaptation, not divine design at the moment of creation.3o An 
implication of this thesis, then, is that humans evolve in similar processes as plants and 
animals. In effect, Darwin's notion of natural selection strips mankind of any sense of 
preordained dignity that makes humans superior to any other species involved in 
processes ofnatural selection.31 
John Dewey observed in 1909 that ''the combination ofthe very words origin and 
species embodied an intellectual revolt .. .In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute 
permanence...the Origins of Species introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was 
bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics 
and religion.,,32 Indeed, the intellectual revolt had profound implications. More 
specifically, Darwinism created a contradiction in nineteenth-century American 
consciousness. On the one hand, Darwinism represented a monumental achievement in 
the workings of man against nature. The notion of natural selection is powerful both in 
explanatory value and in implication. More importantly, it jibed well with the 
increasingly scientific methods of inquiry that were pervasive in the second half of the 
nineteenth-century. On the other hand, Darwinism flew in the face of traditional religious 
narratives. During this period, natural selection was seen as a blasphemous concept that 
30 See Charles Darwin, The Origins ofSpecies, 6TII ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1902), 
75-164. 
31 If Rorty is considered a fugitive figure in the intellectual world, Darwin is seen by some as the 
antichrist. For a variety ofcontemporary readings on the impact ofDarwin, see Niles Eldredge, Reinventing 
Darwin: The Great Debate at the High Table ofEvolutionary Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1995); David N. Stamos, Darwin and the Nature of Species (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2007); John 
Maynard Smith, Did Darwin Get It Right: Essays on Games, Sex, and Evolution (New York: Chapman and 
Hall, 1998). 
32 John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 
1899-1924, Volume 4: 1907-1909, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1976), 3. 
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challenged the authority of God and the bible.33 As Dewey notes above, the coupling of 
"origin" and "species" is an outright challenge to the biblical origins that most Americans 
felt provided a sufficient, ifnot necessary, account of the beginnings ofmankind. 
After the publication of Darwin's Origins ofSpecies, an epistemological crisis of 
enormous proportion ensued. The gauntlet which Darwin threw down required a 
philosophical reassessment to reconcile the new scienticism with the religious traditions 
prevalent in nineteenth-century America. Kuklick believes that pragmatism was the 
answer to this crisis, because as a philosophical doctrine, it was "able to wed evolutionary 
science to a religious world view.,,34 Indeed, as will be discussed below, the early 
pragmatists had the challenge of Darwinism in full view. Their formulations reflect the 
tenuous coexistence of the insights Darwin offers and the American religious tradition. 
Thus, from the outset, pragmatism was required to straddle the [me line between 
abstraction and practicality, which resulted in the melding oftheory with praxis. 35 
Another element in the understanding of the emergence of American pragmatism 
is its founding body: The Metaphysical Club. This loosely bound group of Cambridge 
intellectuals met briefly in the early months of 1872 for informal meetings to discuss 
pressing intellectual issues 0 f their day. Members included figures like Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Chauncey Wright, William James, and Nicholas Green. The central issues 
33 See Louis Menand's discussion on the contradictory character Origins of Species took on in 
American public discourse in the second half of the nineteenth-century in The Metaphysical Club, 140-48. 
34 Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy, 26. Cotkin argues that others who were more 
reluctant about conflating science and religion chose to "compartmentalize" the two forms of knowledge. 
In so doing, one could accept the scientific conclusions of Darwin, while leaving them out of one's 
religious perspectives. See Cotkin's chapter entitled '''The Tangled Bank' of Evolution and Religion" in 
Reluctant Modernism, 1-26. 
35 For a remarkable study on a group ofjin de siecle philosophers and social activists who pushed 
for the realization of such a middle ground, see James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social 
Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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deliberated by this group included the mediation of science and religion, and the state of 
the American intellectual community following the Civil War. Cornel West observes that 
this group of intellectuals ''were preoccupied with method, yet their understanding of 
method was quite Emersonian. Much like Emerson, they were intent on viewing science 
as continuous with religion-both shot through with moral purpose.,,36 From the 
beginning, the social context in which pragmatism was born out of was marked by an 
instrumentalism laced with morality designed to confront the historical realities of the 
post-Darwin, post-Civil War, United States. This, in tum, would affect the ways in which 
American philosophers would formulate their theories and what purposes they would 
ultimately serve. 
The emergence ofpragmatism and the experience ofthe Civil War as a part ofthe 
American identity is a connection that cannot be understated. The scale on which death 
and destruction unfoIded had never been encountered before in human history. Lewis 
Mumford reflects that "on both sides of the line many a fine lad had died in battle, and 
those who survived, in more subtle ways died, toO.,,37 Louis Menand observes that "it is a 
remarkable fact about the Untied States that it fought a civil war without undergoing a 
change in its form of government. The constitution was not abandoned during the 
American Civil War; elections were not suspended; there was no coup d'etat. ..But in 
almost every other respect, the United States became a different country.,,38 What had 
changed was the profound faith in the American way oflife and its accompanying system 
ofbeliefs. The Civil War created the conditions in which the essential components of the 
36 Cornel West, The American Evasion ofPhilosophy: A Genealogy ofPragmatism (Madison, WI: 
The University ofWisconsin Press, 1989),42. 
37 Mumford, The Golden Day, 159. 
38 Menand, The Metaphysical Club, ix. 
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American identity were challenged. As a result, the old methods ofbelief and intellectual 
inquiry could no longer be trusted. Menand concludes that as ''the Civil War swept away 
the slave civilization ofthe South, it swept away almost the whole intellectual culture of 
the North along with it. It took nearly half a century for the United States to develop a 
culture to replace it, to find a new set of ideas, and a way of thinking, that would help 
people cope with conditions ofmodem life.,,39 
The Civil War was only one of several interconnected elements that serve to 
explain the emergence of pragmatism. The impact of industrialization, coupled with the 
effects of the Civil War, created a unique intellectual context in which Peirce and James 
would study. Mumford notes the "when the curtain rose on the post-bellum scene...old 
America was for all practical purposes demolished: industrialism had entered 
overnight. ..All the crude practices of British paleotechnic industry appeared on the new 
scene without relief or mitigation.,,4o The introduction of industrialization radically 
changed the American identity from one defmed by the Transcendentalist notion of 
pastoral innocence to a mechanistic conception of self where "bigness" was championed 
as the means to progress and comfort. Mumford observes that during the Gilded Age 
"business was the only activity it respected; comfort was the only result it sought.,,41 
Thus, with industrialization came its chiefpartner in the race for progress: science. 
Although many Americans of the nineteenth-century saw science as threatening 
traditional religious values, it was also viewed as having terrific emancipatory powers. 
Science promised to guide industrialization on a path towards improvement and progress 
39 Menand, The Metaphysical Club, x.
40 Mumford, The Golden Day, 159.
41 Ibid., 160-1.
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in American life.42 It was no longer a discipline of intrinsic worth to a small minority of 
scholars and academics who were privileged in scientific discourses. Rather, during the 
post-Civil War years, science took on an extrinsic character that would infiltrate the 
popular consciousness of American life. This shift would initiate the technological 
revolution and carry with it profound effects in both the public and intellectual spheres in 
the United States.43 
If the beliefs that once sustained American life before the Civil War were now 
suspect, then the very way philosophy was undertaken underwent revision as well. 
Pragmatism would come to embody the contingency and uncertainty wrought in the wake 
of Darwinism, the Civil War, and industrialization, which was translated into broader 
intellectual concerns. These combined experiences shaped the contours of late 
nineteenth-century American philosophy in one crucial way: philosophy could not be an 
abstract activity that took place within the confmes of social clubs and universities. 
Philosophy required a humanistic touch, based on practical application and experience. In 
such bleak times, philosophy was asked to make sense of the cruelty in the malaise of 
modernity, while also acting as a source ofhope. 
It is not surprising, then, that the philosophical fonnulations of Peirce, James, and 
Dewey all emphasize meliorism as a valuable end of philosophical inquiry. For 
philosopher Colin Koopman, the relationship between pragmatism and meliorism is a 
42 Kloppenberg argues that American philosophers and social critics of the ''fin de siecle via 
media" recognized science to be a potential danger to American culture. Against the notion that science 
operated as a monolith of truth and progress, those of the "via media" argued that "the technical knowledge 
prized by the urban-industrial world... challenged traditional cultural values, and this generation of 
philosophers worried about the future of a world whose religious meaning was dissolving under the 
corrosive influence of the secular society's mania for consumption." See Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory, 
5. 
43 For an in depth discussion on the close relationship between nineteenth-century industrialization 
and scientism, see Mumford, The Golden Day, 158-161. 
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natural one. He observes that "Meliorism, holding together pluralism with humanism, is 
the thesis that we are capable ofcreating better worlds and selves.. .It is tempting, then, to 
see pragmatism as developing the philosophical consequences of meliorism... ,,44 Indeed, 
the face of America had changed after the Civil War, and the American brand of 
philosophy is one of the clearest responses to the shifting intellectual and cultural scenes 
ofjin de siecle America. 
The Early Pragmatists: Peirce, James, Dewey 
Charles Sanders Peirce is considered by most to be the founder of the pragmatist 
movement. He was the first ofthe group to attack the philosophical traditions in Western 
philosophy, and as some believe, the greatest philosopher in American history.45 While 
attending Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard in 1861, William James wrote home 
with this observation ofPeirce: "In last year's [class] there is a son ofProf Peirce, whom 
I suspect to be a very "smart" fellow with a great deal of character, pretty independent 
and violent though.',46 This summation by James aptly describes the somewhat 
paradoxical life of Peirce: a man of exceeding intelligence and ability, yet plagued by 
personal problems that affected his standing in New England academic circles. For the 
most part, Peirce went largely unnoticed during his lifetime, with his second wife selling 
44 Colin Koopman, "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Social Hope: Emerson, James, Dewey, 
Rorty," Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2006): 107. 
45 This point is made by Cornel West in The American Evasion ofPhilosophy, 43. Other scholars 
agree with West's view of Peirce. See Philip P. Wiener, Values in a Universe of Change, ix; Christopher 
Hookway, Peirce (Boston, MA: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1985); Hoopes, Community Denied. In a collection 
of essays by Max Fisch entitled Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), Karl Popper is quoted as stating "Among the few dissenters [of physical determinism] was 
Charles Sanders Peirce, the great American mathematician and physicist and, I believe, one of the greatest 
philosophers ofall time." (426) 
46 William James, "Letter to Family, 16 September 1861", in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought 
and Character of William James, Volume I (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), 211. 
22 
all his papers to Harvard after his death in 1914 for five-hundred dollars.47 In recent 
years, the importance of the life and thought of Peirce has reemerged, with philosophers 
and historians giving close attention to his writings.48 
In 1877 and 1878, Peirce published several essays in Popular Science Monthly 
that in time would come to mark the beginning ofthe American pragmatist movement. In 
the essay "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," Pierce outlines the essence of his 
pragmatism. In his famous "pragmatic maxim," Peirce defines what he sees as the 
function of knowledge and belief: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception ofthese effects is the whole ofour conception of the object.,,49 As puzzling as 
this definition is for making our ideas clear, Peirce illustrates the paradigm shift in the 
function of knowledge and belief. Rather than being preoccupied with the antecedents of 
thought, one should focus on the "practical bearings" of knowledge and belief. Peirce's 
pragmatism (and later pragamaticism) was designed to be a doctrine aimed at the 
clarification of ideas and ofmeaning. With this end in mind, Peirce argues that beliefs are 
the guiding principles of our actions; therefore, our beliefs should be well-thought over, 
deliberated upon, and combed through with the tools of logic so as to ensure our actions 
represent contemplative habits of mind. As a result, Peirce's formulations represent the 
47 See Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufinann, "Introduction to Peirce" in Philosophical Classics, 
Volume IV: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy 3rd ed., Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufinann, eds. (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 377. 
48 For an outstanding contemporary biography of Peirce, see Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders 
Peirce: A Life (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). Other essentials include: Karl-Otto 
Ape1, Charles Sanders Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (Amherst, MA: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1981); Gerard Deledalle, Charles S. Peirce: An Intellectual Biography (Amsterdam: 
John Benjamin's Publishing Co., 1990); Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy 
(Cambrid~e, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
4 Charles Sanders Peirce, "How To Make Ideas Clear," in Baird and Kaufinann, Philosophical 
Classics, 396. 
23 
initial and marked shift away from the forms of philosophical inquiry inherited from the 
Western tradition. 
This shift is significant for several reasons. Peirce is taking on both rationalist and 
empiricist schools in the Western tradition (as well as Kantianism). Descartes takes as his 
starting point a position of total skepticism, where all belief is doubted. Against this line, 
Peirce argues that belief and doubt act in tandem to confirm or deny ideas we confront 
throughout our lives. He posits that belief is the starting and stopping point of all thought, 
in that doubt irritates beliefs, while belief is also that which appeases doubt. Peirce states 
"As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, 
and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for 
action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same 
time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought."sO H.O. 
Mounce locates the crucial step taken by Peirce as bringing the subject back into the 
process of knowing and affecting knowledge. Mounce observes that "Descartes' 
aim...was to step outside his beliefs and to examine them without presupposition...his 
conception of knowledge was in a sense absolute...For Peirce on the other hand, the 
observer is in the midst of the world and knowledge is acquired always from some 
starting point of view or perspective."sl Rather than viewing knowledge as a fixed set of 
beliefs, Peirce takes a radical tum by declaring knowledge to be contingent on an 
observer's interests and beliefs at a particular moment (nor is that all truth equal). To be 
sure, Peirce is not denying that a person can revise their beliefs from time to time when 
relevant information becomes available to do so. However, he is denying that such 
50 Peirce, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," 394. 
51 H.O. Mounce, The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rorty (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 14. 
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revision has to be total, wherein which all belief has to be called into question and 
deliberated in a single sweep of skepticism. 
Peirce's assessment of Cartesian rationalism is equally damaging to the 
empiricists. For the empiricists, "knowing" is reduced to sense perception. According to 
Locke, humans are born with a blank mind ("la tabula rosa") on which knowledge is 
imprinted through sense experience. This view breaks with the rationalist epistemology in 
that it reconfigures the faculty through which knowledge comes to be known. However, 
for Peirce, both rationalism and empiricism share an insistence on the uncovering of 
absolutes: the fundamental foundations of knowledge. While rationalism and empiricism 
differ on the means of attaining knowledge, both are involved in the same pursuit. Hence, 
Peirce circumvents both camps when he denounces such metaphysical concerns and 
brings the subject back into epistemological inquiry. 
This tum can best be explained by Peirce's background in the "hard" sciences and 
his firm belief in fallibilism. He was a man deeply entrenched in the scientific traditions 
of his time, trained as a mathematician, chemist, optician, and geologist, to name but a 
few. In a vignette to "A Guess at a Riddle," Peirce gives his readers some historical 
insight into his intellectual background and the general aims ofhis works: 
From the moment when I could think at all until now, about forty years, I 
have been diligently and incessantly occupied with the study of methods [of] 
inquiry, both those which have been pursued and are pursued and those which 
ought to be pursued. For ten years before this study began, I had been in training 
in the chemical laboratory. I was thoroughly grounded not only in all that was 
then known of physics and chemistry, but also in the way in which those who 
were successfully advancing knowledge proceeded.. .I am saturated, through 
and through, with the spirit ofthe physical sciences.... 
Thus, in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a 
physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the 
philosophers...Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of The demonstrations 
of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.... 
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For years in the course of this ripening process, I used for myself to collect 
my ideas under the designationfallibilism; and indeed the first step toward finding 
out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already; so that no blight can 
so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness; and ninety­
nine out ofevery hundred good heads are reduced to impotence by that malady... 
Indeed, out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the 
reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my philosophy 
has always seemed to me to grow....52 
Peirce viewed himself, first and foremost, as a scientist who espoused philosophical 
theory. However, his notion of science is calculated in the sense that he skirts the 
commitments of empiricism and the precepts of discovering "foundations" through 
philosophical inquiry. Peirce's thorough reliance on methods of induction and the 
premium he places on fallibilism allows him to discard notions of antecedent phenomena 
and, thus, the goals and functions of flfSt philosophy. It is out of this reworking that 
Peirce embodies the vanguard spirit of pragmatism. Moreover, he represents a departure 
from the European roots from which prior American philosophy had been frrmly 
entrenched.53 
An important concept that is derived from Peirce's fallibilism is his 
"communitarian idealism," which avoids many of the major pitfalls of metaphysical 
realism. 54 This community-based epistemology centers on what Peirce terms "the fmal 
opinion": knowledge is not the product of a metaphysically independent entity to which 
52 Charles Sanders Peirce, "Notes for a Book, to be entitled'A Guess at a Riddle,' with a Vignette 
of the Sphynx below the Title," quoted in Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 16-18. 
53 Prior to the pragmatist movement, American philosophy had been dominated by themes largely 
imported from European thought. For example, the Transcendentalists can be seen as borrowing themes 
18thand concepts from the German Idealism of Hegel and from century Romanticism. Pragmatism 
represents a strict departure from these roots because it had finally created a discourse novel to the United 
States which reflected something distinct in the "American experience." See Thayer's Meaning and Action 
432-447. 
54 For an extended discussion of this concept, see Kuklick, The Rise ofAmerican Philosophy 114­
17. For an important work on the pragmatist emphasis on the need for a recovery of community, see 
Jacquelyn Kegley, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities: A Roycean Public Philosophy 
(Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997). 
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the independent observer references. Rather, knowledge is that which endures the test of 
experience over the long run, thus being the result of a "fmal opinion." Peirce argues that 
errors in thought and other epistemological accidents will be filtered out by the common 
opinion in a community. Truth, then, is what every woman and man would naturally 
believe, given an appropriate amount of time and information. Peirce observes "Let any 
human being have enough information and exert enough thought on any question, and the 
result will be that he will arrive at a certain conclusion, which is the same that any other 
mind will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances.,,55 
Peircean epistemology privileges a community discourse, espousing that truth will 
"come out in the wash." This formulation allows Peirce to avoid the mind-body 
distinction inherited from Cartesian metaphysical realism, while simultaneously 
affirming scientific modes of inquiry as the correct epistemological approach to questions 
of knowledge. It is in Peirce's community-based epistemology, combined with the 
relevance of the subject's perspective in inquiry, that one can locate his sense of 
meliorism. By formulating a doctrine of meaning that accounts for the interests and 
beliefs of the individual, and that factors in the inevitability of fallibility, Peirce's 
pragmatism is implicitly melioristic. 56 
As noted above, Peirce's communitarianism places a premium on collaboration 
and group deliberation in the consensus-developing process. It is obvious that these are 
all values that are necessary to sustain liberal ideals and democracy in the United States. 
55 Peirce, 81. 
56 Mounce makes a similar point on page 18 in The Two Pragmatisms. In a discussion of Peirce's 
emphasis on fallibilism, Mounce notes: "Now the view of science we are illustrating here has an important 
consequence. As we have said, scientific activity is, as it were, groping into the unknown. Since this is so, 
any general view of things which we develop today is liable to be replaced tomorrow by our moving into a 
wider perspective still. This view of science is known asfallibilism...This view is not pessimistic. Quite the 
contrary, it presupposes that science is, or can be, progressive. Tomorrow we are liable to change our view 
because we are liable to be in a better position to appreciate where we stand today." 
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For Peirce, the self-community dichotomy needs to be overcome: the dichotomization of 
the two creates detached spheres that inhibit group progress by privileging the individual. 
Hoopes notes that "Peirce's philosophy, far more than James's or Dewey's, makes it 
possible to see that our relation to society has some of the same kind of integration, some 
of the same kind of reality, as do the relations within us that constitute our individual 
minds and selves.,,57 For all the prestige and perceived debt owed to James and Dewey 
for the contribution to liberal politics, "their philosophy contained elements of old-
fashioned, subjective logic that prevented James and Dewey from entirely escaping an 
illogical individualism.,,58 Thus, Peirce's communitarianism is a doctrine ''which was 
mainly a hopeful insistence on the obvious correctness of the proposition that no man is 
an island.,,59 
William James is often identified as the key figure in the popularization ofpragmatism in 
both academic and social discourses in the United States around the tum ofthe twentieth­
century,60 James, though, viewed himself as working within a tradition that did not start 
with him, but with his older colleague Peirce. To be sure, in an 1898 lecture in Berkeley 
titled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," James gave full credit for 
57 Hoopes, Community Denied, 11. 
58 Ibid., 12. 
59 Ibid., 15. 
60 The suggested readings for William James are voluminous. However, a few essentials can be 
listed here. See Gay Wilson Allen, William James: A Biography (New York: The Viking Press, 1967); 
Jacques Barzun, A Stroll with William James (New York: Harper and Row, 1983); George Cotkin, William 
James: Public Philosopher (Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Gerald Myers, 
William James: His Thought and Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Ralph Barton Perry, The 
Thought and Character of William James, Two Volumes (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935); 
George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States, with Reminiscences of William James and 
Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920); Charlene 
Haddock Seigfried, Chaos and Context: A Study of William James (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978); 
Ellen K. Suckiel, The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1982); John Wild, The Radical Empiricism ofWilliam James (New York: Doubleday, 1969). 
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pragmatism's founding to Peirce.61 What each maintains pragmatism to be, though, is a 
different matter. 
Whereas Peirce identifies his form of pragmatism as a logical tool to test the 
consequences ofpropositions, James's pragmatism is more humanistic, moral, and looser 
in its aims and scope.62 John Dewey, in "The Development of American Pragmatism," 
describes this difference: 
Peirce was above all a logician; whereas James was an educator and humanist and 
wished to force the general public to realize that certain problems, certain 
philosophical debates, have a real importance for mankind, because the beliefs 
which they bring into play lead to very different modes of conduct. If this 
important distinction is not grasped, it is impossible to understand the majority of 
the ambiguities and errors which belong to the later period of the pragmatic 
movement. 63 
Moreover, Peirce's pragmatism is mainly a theory of meaning (the clarification of ideas); 
after James, pragmatism becomes popularized as a theory of truth.64 For Peirce, 
pragmatism enables an engaged inquirer to discern between the meaning of propositions 
with the use of logical tools. James, on the other hand, is concerned with the truth value 
ofpropositions and their practical consequences. Hence, James is less concerned with the 
nuts and bolts of a proposition than he is with their ability to payoff. Thus, the crucial 
61 After Peirce was black listed from professional academics in the 1880s, he fell into a state of 
abject poverty for the remainder of his life. While many of Peirce's old colleagues had abandoned him, 
William James remained charitable towards him for the rest of his life. On numerous occasions, James 
campaigned for Peirce to obtain lectureships and other academic postings (with minimal success). In The 
Two Pragmatisms, H.O. Mounce argues that James's use of the term "pragmatism" in the 1898 Berkeley 
lecture "was an act ofcharacteristic generosity." (43) Menand's The Metaphysical Club and Brent's Peirce 
chronicle many of the more specific occasions and types ofcharity James bestowed Peirce. 
62 Thayer identifies this major difference as grounded in "the dominant historical spirit" ofJames's 
era. He argues that James's moralistic reconfiguration of pragmatism was a response to "the present 
dilemma in philosophy." For James, the growing gap between morality and knowledge required a theory of 
truth that could mediate the two. Thus, James's commitment to pluralism and social individualism opened 
pragmatism up to a wide and diverse variety oftopics. See Thayer's Meaning and Action, 420-2. 
63 Dewey, "The Development ofAmerican Pragmatism," 19.
64 For an interesting analysis ofthis move by James, see Mounce, The Two Pragmatisms, 36-52.
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divisions between Peircean and Jamesean pragmatism may be seen as centering on the 
place oflogic in philosophical inquiry. 
James's objections to logic has less to do with Peirce and his mode of inquiry, 
and more with the legacy ofHegel that was pervasive in nineteenth-century New England 
intellectual circles. Cotkin observes that "not all philosophers practicing in the fmal 
decades of the nineteenth century were content with a pragmatic philosophical 
perspective that failed to serve a fully satisfying main course of cosmic order, rationality, 
and progress.,,65 For philosophers like George S. Morris, William T. Harris, and George 
Holmes Howison, Hegel provides the necessary foundations for their variety of 
philosophical proclivities. For James, the infatuation with Hegel poses a threat to issues 
of moral concern. Philosopher A.J. Ayer observes that the "roots of [James's] objection 
to Hegelianism were emotional and moral. Emotionally he found it stifling...What he 
fmds morally shocking in Hegelianism is its pretence that pain and evil are not real, or 
anyhow not real enough to worry about.,,66 The logic of Hegel-the dialectic-is 
dangerous because it threatens to strip human suffering and evil of its historicity and 
humanity. For James and the other pragmatists, philosophy should resist systems and 
abstractions that neglect the practical consequences. While some would argue that 
Hegelian logic has profound implications for evil and suffering, James sees it as failing to 
translate into the ''ways things actually are". 
Although the station of logic in philosophy represents a key difference between 
Peirce and James, both agree that the search for epistemological foundations must be 
abandoned in favor of practical forms of knowledge that allow for contingency, 
65 Cotkin, Reluctant Modernism, 44. 
66 A.J. Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy ofCharles Sanders Peirce and 
William James (San Francisco, CA: Freeman, Cooper, and Company, 1968), 176-7. 
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fallibility, and future revision. It is for this reason that both men agree on the need to 
include scientific approaches in philosophical inquiry. Cotkin notes that "James made 
quite clear that pragmatism began by associating itself with the proven experimental 
method ofmodem science. The essence of this method, under whose banner pragmatism 
proudly marched, demanded close attention to facts, as well as an openness to the 
revision ofhypotheses in the light of experimental negation.,,67 It is this sense that James 
saw himself as inheriting the mantle of pragmatism, as sharing the common vision of 
testing ideas in experience. Thus, James views epistemology as an experimental process 
aimed at producing knowledge that can ameliorate the negative aspects of the human 
condition (rather than a project to reconstruct the foundations of first philosophy). 
In its most basic form, James's pragmatism as a theory of truth emphasizes both 
the functionality and limits of knowledge. As noted above, his form of pragmatism was 
designed to combat the effects of Hegelianism, but other contingencies existed that lead 
James to espouse his doctrine of pragmatism. For James, pragmatism was meant to be a 
mediatory methodology for the "present dilemma in philosophy" of his time. This 
dilemma centers on the intellectual divisions between what James categorizes as the 
''tender-minded'' and the ''tough-minded.'' The former group is described by James as 
being "rationalistic," "religious," and "Idealistic"; the latter is "Empiricist," 
"Materialistic," and "Irreligious.,,68 James views the split as threatening moral virtue and 
religious belief He believes that such divisions would ultimately result in 
67 Cotkin, William James: Public Philosopher, 163. 
68 James's famous two-column description of the differences between the "tender-minded" and the 
"tough-minded" can be found in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1943), 20. 
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epistemological skepticism where each camp would accuse the other of philosophical 
malpractice. 
In his lecture entitled "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," James observes the 
quandary created by such divisions: 
You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to facts 
and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and 
accommodation, in short, but also the confidence in human values and the 
resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type. And this 
then is your dilemma: you find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or 
else you fmd a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but 
that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows.69 
James sees each camp as carrying serious shortcomings. Accordingly, James views 
pragmatism as a device that will at once show the limits ofknowledge (as to illustrate the 
deficiencies of the projects of the rationalists and empiricists-the uncovering of 
"foundations") and develop truth qua utility (rather than as an absolute). 
James's pragmatism is best exemplified by his notion ofthe "cash-value" oftruth: 
the truth of a proposition lies in its ability to payoff; that is, allowing one to get along 
better in the experiential world. 7o Describing his pragmatic notion of truth, James writes 
"Pragmatism...asks its usual questions. 'Grant an idea or belief to be true,' it says 'what 
69 James, Pragmatism, 20. 
70 Not every observer agrees with James's notion of the cash-value of truth. In his 1908 essay 
entitled "William James's Conception of Truth," Bertrand Russell takes James to task on his assertion that 
"the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way belief, and good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons." (See James, "What Pragmatism Means," in McDermott, 388). Russell argues that "the 
notion that it is quite easy to know when the consequences of a belief are good, so easy, in fact, that a 
theory ofknowledge need take no account ofanything so simple-this notion, I must say, seems to me one 
of the strangest assumptions for a theory of knowledge to make." See Russell, "William James's 
Conception of Truth," in Bertrand Russell: Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 
119. For Russell, the confusion over truth in a pragmatist framework centers around the distinction between 
meaning and criterion. Russell notes that " ... ifpragmatists only affirmed that utility is a criterion of truth, 
there would be much less to be said against their view. For there certainly seems to be few cases, if any, in 
which it is clearly useful to believe what is false. The chief criticism one would then have to make on 
pragmatism would be to deny that utility is a useful criterion, because it is so often harder to determine 
whether a belief is useful than whether it is true. The arguments of pragmatists are almost wholly directed 
to proving that utility is a criterion; that utility is the meaning oftruth is then supposed to follow." (120-1) 
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concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be 
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief 
were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?,,71 This 
formulation is consistent with Peirce's insistence on grounding meaning in empirical, 
rather than metaphysical, terms. Also, James's utilitarian-esque epistemology is laden 
with scientific rhetoric that emphasizes the testing of ideas through experience, the 
outcome of experiential processes, and the moral value of such processes. This emphasis 
on scientific methods is reminiscent of Peirce as well. Thus, like Peirce, James's 
pragmatism can be seen as yet another challenge to the traditions in Western philosophy 
which seek to uncover antecedent phenomena that have little bearing on the practical 
consequences of human inquiry and action. It is telling then that James dedicates 
Pragmatism to John Stuart Mill "for whom I first learned the pragmatic openness ofmind 
and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive to-day."n 
As observed above, a key shift that occurs with James in the history of 
pragmatism is the overt moral character it assumes. For James, the mediation of the 
"present dilemma in philosophy" derives its purposes from the moral implications of the 
binary relationship between tender-minded and tough-minded.73 On the one hand, if a 
person is aligned with the empiricist camp (the tough-minded), they could be charged 
with irreligiousness and propagating moral degradation. James witnessed first hand how 
the Darwinian Revolution exacerbated the negative perception of the "tough-minded": 
71 James, Pragmatism, 200. 
72 Ibid., xi. 
73 See Thayer, Meaning and Action, 422. Thayer argues that "the role that James helped to create 
for pragmatism, the moral function, was retained in the later history...James thought of pragmatism as a 
way in which man's otherwise disparate and dilemmatic interests in religious beliefs and hard scientific 
facts could be linked together.,,73 
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the empiricist community was viewed as denigrating the role of church and God, a move 
that threatened the moral fiber of American life. On the other hand, if one maintained a 
rationalist worldview (the tender-minded), they ran the risk of neglecting the hard facts 
that science provided. It must be remembered that for all its shortcomings and charges 0 f 
irre1igiousness, science was having an undeniable social and cultural impact in America 
in the late nineteenth-century. For James, intellectual life requires a mode of inquiry that 
allowed both for brute facts and purposive habits ofmind. The aim ofphilosophy, then, is 
not to divide and conquer, but to ask meaningful questions that could potentially "pay 
off' in the form of human flourishing and the establishment of dual beliefs in both 
religion and science. 
As a result of the moralization of pragmatism by James, it would now take on a 
social role as a turn-of-the century public philosophy.74 As many commentators observe, 
James's emphasis on the pragmatic themes of contingency, pluralism, and individualism 
illustrate his moral commitment to the betterment of the public sphere, so as to promote 
creativity and human freedom. To be sure, James's philosophical interests were heavily 
intertwined with the social and cultural issues of his times. Not only is James's 
pragmatism a response to the contradictions between the tender-minded and tough-
minded camps, but it is also a manifestation ofthe increasingly fragmented identity of the 
upper-middle class in American society. 75 
74 For a critical analysis on the context in which pragmatism grew into a public philosophy, see 
Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Is the Revival of Pragmatism Practical, or What are the Consequences of Pragmatism?" 
in Constellations 6, no. 4 (1999): 561-87. 
75 Cotkin observes that during the second half of the nineteenth-century, the attitude of 
"desiccation" was pervasive among the upper and middle classes. He writes that "the etiology of 
desiccation, otherwise commonly referred to as neurasthenia, was mixed, but its effects could be numbing, 
provoking the sufferer to adopt a "nightmare" or "bass note" view of life." See George Cotkin, "William 
James and Richard Rorty: Context and Conversation," in Pragmatism: From Progressivism to 
Pos/modernism, eds. Robert Hollinger and David Depew (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995): 38-55. 
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In James's later works, he came to champion the necessity of the individual's 
liberty as a crucial component of moral and practical life. His essay ''The Will to 
Believe" illustrates the utility of beliefs in allowing the individual to get along better in 
the world. Mounce connects James's concern for the individual with his struggles with 
depression throughout his life: "It may be remembered that James had become convinced 
in early manhood, through his struggle with nervous depression, that one is entitled to 
believe independently ofreason. Some truths, or so he came to believe, can be discovered 
only by those who have the faith to take them as such.,,76 James's individualism can also 
be said to be a response to industrialization and American expansion abroad during the 
last years of the nineteenth-century. For James, this created a moral and philosophical 
problem: the "bigness" of industrialization and imperialism threatened to stifle the 
freedom of individual creativity and her or his capacity to actively affect change in their 
lives. Koopman observes that for James, ''the larger the institution, the more easily our 
freedom is rendered ineffective. Greater masses channel our energies through 
mechanisms that hollow them of all creative force. James's concern is that we too readily 
institutionalize our social relationships in forms that supersede, and later extinguish, the 
actual energies they were supposed to cultivate.,,77 Thus, James's focus on individualism 
is symptomatic of the social context in which he was writing. The threat to individual 
76 Mounce, The Two Pragmatisms, 88. Here, Mounce provides some enlightening background on 
James's "The Will to Believe." He reports that James had regretted the title employing the word "will." 
James felt that the use of will implies that a believer is justified in holding any belief that can be "willed." 
He would have preferred the phrase "The Right to Believe" as it implies a larger criterion of belief than 
"rationality" can hold for. Hence, one has the right to believe x, according to an expanded notion of what 
counts as knowledge. 
77 Colin Koopman, "William James's Politics of Personal Freedom," in Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2005): 180. For an insightful piece that depicts the more radical implications of 
James's emphasis on individualism, see Deborah Coon, "'One Moment in the World's Salvation': 
Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James," in The Journal ofAmerican History 83, no. 1 (June 
1996): 70-99. See also James's A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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liberty by the mechanisms of large institutions required a philosophical reassessment of 
the place of the individual within such a society. Taken on the whole, this represents 
James's fundamental concern with the practical effects of philosophy and the 
amelioration ofsocial problems that individuals faced. 
Thus, James's pragmatism is shot through with mediations on a number oflevels: 
intellectual, social, and individual. Initially a response to the conflicts between the 
scientific and religious communities in New England, James's pragmatism began to 
mediate the relationship between the individual and the modem world. While James's 
concerns are less with the community on the whole, he worried about the social situations 
that individuals mediated at the personal level: James's meliorism deals directly with the 
ability to act and create, and, thereby, to improve. However, actions aimed at human 
development require a reconfiguration of the traditional notions of truth. Hence, James 
believed that for meliorism to operate as a social process, epistemological notions oftruth 
must be loosened up to allow for pluralistic and humanistic interpretations of social 
reality. West observes "For James, the universe is incomplete, the world is still "in the 
making" owing to the impact ofhuman powers on the universe and the world. Therefore, 
inquiry into truth about this universe and world produces contingent and revisable claims 
that are convincing.,,78 Truth, then, is "an instrument-prompted by provocation, 
promoted by melioristic faith, and deployed by strenuous heroic persons against obstacles 
in order to further the moral development of individuals.,,79 We can see that, like Peirce, 
the ways in which humans affect change corresponds to how they perceive their 
78 West, The American Evasion ofPhilosophy, 65. 
79 Ibid., 66. 
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relationship to a community, their role in change, and the function oCknow1edge in such 
a process. 
John Dewey was born in 1859 and lived for ninety-two years. This is not an arbitrary 
passing observation. Over Dewey's lifetime, he witnessed some of the most important 
and transformative technological and social advances that proved to have profound 
effects in the United States. Not only does Dewey share his birth year with the 
publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, he also lived to see the introduction of 
Einstein's Theory of Relativity, the birth of quantum mechanics, and the development of 
the Atomic age. As a result, Dewey's pragmatism took on a more mature character than 
that of his predecessors, Peirce and James. His pragmatism combines the scientific 
prerogatives of Peirce with the moralism of James to produce a philosophy that reflects 
the social context ofhis time. 8o Thus, in a sense Dewey represents a synthesis ofthe early 
pragmatist tradition in which he takes what he sees as the most useful aspects of Peirce 
and James and couples them with his own intellectual methods and concerns. 
The scope ofDewey's academic writings and thought is staggering. The topics he 
covers vary from educational theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, as 
well as the more traditional philosophical terrain encompassing metaphysics and 
epistemology. Although his professional interests are :multiple, his commitment to 
pragmatism and its methods of inquiry unifies his thought and writing. 
80 For an in-depth analysis on Dewey's melding of the methods and aims ofPeirce and James, see 
Thayer, Meaning and Action, 165. For overlap and divergence between Dewey, and Pierce and James, see 
also Susan Haack, "The Pragmatist Theory ofTruth," in The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 27, no. 3 (September 1976): 231-49. 
37 
Much the same as Peirce and James, Dewey VIews sCIence as possessmg 
enormous potential for the betterment of mankind. The emphasis science places on 
revision, fallibility, and the potentiality of future theories that are more predictive and 
illuminating is a source ofhope among the pragmatists. Yet Dewey and his predecessors 
see a danger in the growth of scientism: as science begins to provide a clearer picture of 
the natural world, it runs the risk of becoming amoral, static, and devoid of practical 
concerns and human interests. This would grow into a fundamental concern for Dewey 
over his lifetime. 
As shown above, Dewey's pragmatism is the product of a historically specific 
moment. Having witnessed the extreme transformative effects of science in the modem 
world, Dewey was confronted with the reality of an increasing gap between science and 
morality. Science had given the world a clearer picture of its molecular makeup, a 
stronger sense of the origins ofthe universe, as well as a device that could put an end to 
humanity. For Dewey, the technological revolution that science fostered only served to 
sharpen the cleavage between science and morality. 
Dewey's pragmatism attempts what James had tried to do, but in a much different 
world: to dissolve the notion that science and morality were mutually exclusive 
categories. Whereas James was confronting an intellectual dilemma that existed between 
the scientific community and religious believers, Dewey faced an extreme challenge 
between the growing divergence of science and humanity itself. That is, while James's 
concerns were certainly practical in aim, they still remained somewhat abstract in form. 
On the other hand, Dewey occupied a moment in history when the forces of science were 
being made manifest and their implications were being realized in their full brunt. James 
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lived in a world where the abyss was ever present, but able to be withstood at arms 
length. For Dewey, though, the world was threatened to be enveloped in the abyss of 
totalitarianism and nuclear warfare. This, then, is the context out of which Dewey's 
. 81pragmatIsm arose. 
Throughout his writings, Dewey maintains a profound dissatisfaction with the 
detached and increasingly specialized character of philosophy. He views the divisions 
maintained between, say, the sciences and ethics, or philosophy and practical human 
concerns, as ''the greatest misfortune and most serious intellectual error of the present 
century."82 In 1917, Dewey observed this tendency in present philosophy: "More 
emphasis has been put on what philosophy is not than upon what it may become...There 
are human difficulties of an urgent, deep-seated kind which may be clarified by trained 
reflection...Philosophy will not solve these problems; philosophy is vision, imagination, 
reflection-and these functions, apart from action, modify nothing and hence resoIve 
nothing.,,83 Dewey believes that a recovery is necessary if philosophy is to have a 
practical bearing on issues of human concern. He observes that "philosophy recovers 
itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and 
becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems ofmen.,,84 
81 For a decisive analysis of Dewey's life and thought, see Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and 
American Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Other essentials include: Thomas 
Alexander, John Dewey's Theory ofArt, Experience, and Nature (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1987); Raymond 
Boisvert, Dewey's Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); James Campbell, 
Understanding John Dewey (LaSalle, lL: Open Court, 1995); Neil Coughlan, Young Dewey: An Essay in 
American Intellectual History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973); George Dykhuizen, The 
Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973); Stephen 
Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991); Ralph Sleeper, The Necessity ofPragmatism: John Dewey's Conception ofPhilosophy (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986). 
82 Thayer, Meaning and Action, 166. 
83 Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy," in John 1. Stuhr, ed., Classical American 
Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 345. 
84 Ibid., 345. 
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Thus, for Dewey, recovery requires reconstruction: if philosophy is to become a 
"method" for "dealing with the problems of men" philosophers will need to reconstruct 
the very notion of the aims and purposes of philosophy. Therefore, Dewey envisions 
philosophy as an instrument for confronting human concerns and for discerning the 
possible consequences of intellectual inquiry 0 f such concerns. 
Dewey's pragmatism is best identified by his instrumentalism. To bridge the gap 
between science and morality, Dewey suggests that philosophy must be reconstructed: 
theories of knowledge, science, and morality must be viewed as interconnected and shot 
through with human interests and values. 85 Hence, scientific inquiry should operate under 
a paradigm that has the interests and values of mankind in full view. That is, the 
consequences of scientific investigation should always be tested for their practical 
bearing in human affairs. Therefore, scientific knowledge (among other forms of 
knowledge) should have instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value. 
Dewey defmes his instrumentalism as follows: 
Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of 
judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how 
thoughtfunctions in the experimental determinations offuture consequences. That 
is to say, it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of 
logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or meditative function ascribed to 
reason. It aims to constitute a theory of the general forms of conception and 
reasoning, and not ofthis or that particular judgment or concept related to its own 
content, or to its particular implications.86 
True to form, Dewey's defmition is all but clear. However, the point is well taken: 
thought or thinking is an instrument from which we derive knowledge; as it were, thought 
85 See Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). This is an important collection of philosophical lectures that 
examine the nature of the relationship between facts and values, and how the dichotomy is no longer useful 
(and in pragmatist terms, then, it no longer holds). In Deweyan spirit, Putnam argues that science can still 
be a sound source ofknowledge, while acknowledging the fact that it is laden with value judgments. 
86 Dewey, "Development ofAmerican Philosophy," 26. My emphasis. 
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is purposive and aimed at the consequences to which reason makes us beholden. Thus, 
Dewey's instrumentalism seeks to underwrite the conditions in which (1) thought occurs 
and (2) the consequences ofsuch processes. 
On such a model, it becomes possible for Dewey to ameliorate, theoretically, the 
science-morality gap. Since thought is purposive and aimed at future consequences, 
scientific inquiry is no longer thought of as taking place within a vacuum. Rather, on 
Dewey's instrumentalist model, because thought is purposive, it is laden with values and 
interests. Accordingly, reason mediates the thought-act of determining the future 
consequences of inquiry and the act of thought itself Hence, knowledge is instrumental 
in that it is a tool for determining such consequences. Seen in these terms, science and 
morality become wedded and the dichotomy collapses. In Reconstruction in Philosophy 
Dewey describes the implications of this reconstruction: "When the consciousness of 
science is fully impregnated with the consciousness ofhuman value, the greatest dualism 
which now weighs humanity down, the split between the material, the mechanical, the 
scientific and the moral and ideal will be destroyed."s7 
Implicit to Dewey's instrumentalism is an epistemological critique ofthe Western 
tradition dating back to Plato. For Dewey, the co-optation ofphilosophy by epistemology 
and its projects was the cause of the increasing gap between science and philosophy. 
Historian Robert Westbrook observes that ''the consequences of this swallowing up of 
modem philosophy by epistemology, Dewey advised, had been disastrous. Not only had 
epistemologists not delivered the Reality they promised, but in trying to grasp it and in 
contemptuously dismissing ordinary belief, they had cut philosophy off from science."ss 
87 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 173. 
88 Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 124. 
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For Dewey, the epistemological prolllise of foundations is foregone, and he posits 
instrumentalism to be a more fruitful path of inquiry-this attitude leads Dewey to 
formulate his notion of"immediate empiricism." 
Dewey built on the antifoundationalist mantles ofPeirce and James and created an 
epistemology that locates truth and knowledge in experience-the essence of early 
pragmatism. In his essay titled "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," Dewey 
outlines his epistemological stance which he calls "immediate empiricism." Defining this 
term, he states: "Immediate empiricism postulates that things-anything, everything, in 
the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing'-are what they are experienced as. 
Hence, ifone wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as 
being."s9 With this defmition, Dewey is doing three things simultaneously: fIrst, he is 
attacking the correspondence theory of truth; second, he is asserting that objects come to 
be known by their "consequent phenomena"- what the results of experiences are, and 
what can be said about an object; and third, he is challenging the concept of truth as an 
epistemological category, preferring the more probabilistic adjective "truly." 
For Dewey, immediate empiricism represents a strong move away from the 
traditions of modern epistemology. On a traditional empiricist model, knowledge is 
something perceived through our senses. We come to know things through their relations 
with our senses. On such an account, experience is implicitly passive, with the observer 
somewhat detached from her environment. Dewey, in effect, does away with the notion 
that knowledge is relational between objects and our senses. Rather, Dewey holds that 
knowledge is something interacted with, something we take part in and affect. Westbrook 
89 Dewey, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," in James and Dewey on Belief and 
Experience, eds. John M. Capps and Donald Capps (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2005), 189. 
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observes that "Dewey believed that persuasive evidence for his "postulate of immediate 
empiricism" was provided by evolutionary biology, which had established that 
experience was a process of interaction between a living being and its environment.,,90 
No doubt, this represents a clear sign of the influence of the Darwinian Revolution and 
the impact it had on the ways in which Dewey formulated his discourse.91 Thus, for 
Dewey, immediate empiricism is a corollary of instrumentalism in that knowledge is 
gained through the examination ofthought itself 
On the surface, Dewey's formulation appears quite flimsy. An epistemological 
conception of immediate experience as the mediator of true knowledge appears 
problematic on a number of levels. What is the relationship between immediate sense 
datum and the idea with which it corresponds? And what is the role of ideas in an 
epistemology that is based entirely in experience? Dewey responds to such charges by 
examining the tradition from which we base our very notions ofknowledge and truth. He 
writes "Except for the occasional protest, historic philosophies have been 
'transcendental.' And this trait ofphilosophies is a reflex of the fact that dominant moral 
codes and religious beliefs have appealed for support to something above and beyond 
experience. Experience has been systematically disparaged in contrast with something 
taken to be more fundamental and superior in worth.,,92 Dewey emphasizes the 
dominance of the traditional dichotomization of the phenomenal and noumenal, the 
subject and the object, and the temporal and the eternal. The inherited traditions ofPlato, 
Descartes and Kant, which put a premium on such dichotomies, have served as the 
90 Westbrook, 127.
91 See Dewey, "The fufluence ofDarwinism on Philosophy," 8-14.
92 Dewey, "What I Believe," in James andDewey on Beliefand Experience, 216.
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epistemological paradigm for over two thousand years.93 Dewey observes that throughout 
the history of philosophy Himpermanence meant insecurity; the permanent was a sole 
ground ofassurance and support amid the vicissitudes ofexistence.,,94 
However, for Dewey, the security provided by the traditional epistemological 
model ignores the historical facticity ofknowledge. Dewey's epistemological perspective 
(which places experience as the prImary epistemic category) requires the 
acknowledgment that knowledge is the result of the relationship between humans and the 
world in highly specific social, political, and cultural circumstances and with particular 
social interests in mind. It is here where Dew1ey's melioristic function of philosophy 
comes to the surface. Knowledge and the "knowing subject" interact in a social 
relationship. Once this relationship is brought into view, knowledge is no longer 
something permanent or detached from concrete human reality. Rather, knowledge is 
created and affected through human action, and truth is more of "a way" than an eternal 
principle. It is here where the potential for positive change in the future is located. 
Hopefulness, or meliorism, is Hat the heart of pragmatism," and is realized "in the 
abilities ofhuman effort to create better future realities.,,95 
It becomes apparent why Peirce, James, and Dewey can be viewed as making a radical 
departure from the traditions of Western philosophy: their consistent calls for the 
93 In Reconstruction in Philosophy Dewey uses the metaphor of feudal society to describe the 
hierarchies in the classical tradition. He writes "In a feudally organized society... each kinship group or 
species occupies a definite place. It is marked by the possession of a specific rank higher or lower with 
respect to other grades. This position confers upon it certain privileges, enabling it to enforce certain claims 
upon those lower in the scale and entailing upon it certain services and homage to be rendered to 
superiors...The classic theory of the constitution of the world corresponds point by point to this ordering of 
classes in a scale ofdignity and power." (63) 
94 Dewey, "What I Believe," 218. 
95 Koopman, "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Hope," 109. 
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abandonment of foundational epistemologies entails the loss of the guarantee of 
universals. This results in the utility, not eternity, oftruth and knowledge. Moreover, their 
commitment to challenging the foundations of first philosophy illustrates a deep 
awareness 0 f the historicity and social function 0 f philosophical inquiry. Questions asked 
by Descartes and Kant seemed no longer relevant in the context of nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century American society. The pragmatist philosophers faced new problems 
that required a fundamental reworking of their philosophical perspectives to address 
important public issues. What they did was to remove philosophy from the ivory tower 
and ask it to go to work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RICHARD RORTY AND THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM 
Richard Rorty's revival of pragmatism in the late 1970s and early 1980s marked an 
important moment in the intellectual history ofthe United States. It was the rebirth of the 
American philosophical legacy that most considered extinct. The America that Dewey 
left in 1952 was quite different than the one neopragmatists live in today. After victory in 
World War II, America found itself entrenched in the fight against communism. This 
fight would take the United States into Korea and Vietnam only to result in stalemate and 
eventual defeat. The 1960s witnessed a cultural revolution that shattered the American 
consensus.96 Fragmentation of consensus can also be found in the Civil Rights 
movement-questions and issues pertaining to race relations that began with 
conversations in the 1960s persist today. Taken together, all of these events profoundly 
transformed the character and identity of the United States. Thus, the contexts of 
classical pragmatism and contemporary pragmatism play an important role in discerning 
the similarities and differences between the two. 
Decline 
To some, pragmatism is viewed as having fallen by the wayside after the Second World 
War: the threat of nuclear attack and the prevailing atmosphere of fear during the initial 
years of the Cold War rendered pragmatism impractical in the social and political 
96 The question ofconsensus in the American identity is a highly contentious topic. For a thorough 
exposition of the "liberal consensus" of the 1950s, see Charles Maland, "Dr. Strangeiove (1964): 
Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology of Liberal Consensus," in American Quarterly 31, no. 5, Special 
Issue: Film and American Studies (Winter 1979): 697-717. 
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conditions of the 1950s. It would be a mistake, though, to reduce dissatisfaction with 
pragmatism as a result of World War II and the onslaught of the Cold War. Historian 
John Patrick Diggins argues that dissatisfaction with the pragmatic tradition can be traced 
back to the 191 Os and 1920s.97 
Dewey and his followers were criticized during the First World War by culture 
critics who saw the doctrines ofpragmatism as either impotent or dangerous to the public 
consciousness of the United States. In 1917, progressive writer Randolph Bourne voiced 
his doubts about Dewey: "What concerns us here is the relative ease with which the 
pragmatist intellectuals, with Professor Dewey at the head, have moved out their 
philosophy, bag and baggage, from education to war...How could the pragmatist accept 
war without more violent protest, without a greater wrench?,,98 Morris Dickstein argues 
that World War I "discredited the kind of enlightened planning with which pragmatism 
had become identified. The reaction against progressivism after 1920 also became a 
reaction against pragmatism, among conservatives who celebrated America's 
exceptionalism and achievements and as well among radicals who castigated its abuses 
and inequalities.,,99 On such a view, the first cracks in the pragmatist movement appear 
much earlier than the rise of fascism and the nuclear age. 
97 Diggins argues that "To suggest that liberal pragmatism became a casualty of the cold war is far 
from the whole story of the philosophy's decline in the post-World War II era. Since the twenties and 
thirties disillusioned writers of the "lost generation" and militant Marxists had attacked pragmatism for its 
unflinching optimism, its superficial faith in science and technology, its innocence of corporate power, and 
its alleged unconcern about the cultural deprivations of the American environment." See The Promise of 
Pragmatism: Modernism, and the Crisis ofKnowledge andAuthority (Chicago: The University ofChicago 
Press, 1995),404. 
98 Randolph Bourne, "Twilight ofIdols," in The Radical Will: Selected Writings, 1911-1918, ed. 
OlafHansen (New York: Urizen Books, 1977),339. 
99 Morris Dickstein, "Introduction," in The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social 
Thought, Law, and Culture, ed. Morris Dickstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998),9. 
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Others argue that pragmatism's decline was the result ofthe increasing popularity 
of analytic philosophy during the 1930s and 1940s. With an influx of European 
intellectual refugees-most notably Reichenbach, Tarski, Camap, Feigl, and Hempl­
during World War II, philosophy departments all across America embraced the scientific 
methodologies and emphasis on specialization brought by the Logical Positivists. Carl 
Schorske argues that the dominance of analytic philosophy was characteristic of the 
''New Rigorism" that took hold following the Second World War. 100 H.O. Mounce argues 
that the dominance of the Logical Positivists "seems to be social rather than 
philosophical. The newcomers were European intellectuals, who were on familiar terms 
with some of the leading scientists, who were familiar with the latest scientific 
discoveries and who were proficient in the techniques of logic and mathematics. This 
gave them prestige and it was this prestige...which accounts for their success.,,101 
Philosophically, such perspectives as those espoused by the Logical Positivists promised 
a kind of progress and rigorism that was consistent with the consciousness of the middle 
twentieth-century. The dual specters of communism and nuclear holocaust required more 
than a philosophy of mediation, fallibilism, and possibility. A philosophy that was both 
hardy and precise was needed if the United States was to overcome the threat of 
totalitarianism domestically and abroad. The tender-minded pragmatists no longer had 
any relevant position in the maintenance ofAmerican Philosophy. 102 
100 Schorske observed that the "New Rigorism," particularly in the natural sciences, moved from 
methodologies of "loose engagement with a multifaceted reality historically perceived to the creation of 
sharp analytic tools that could promise certainty where description and speculative explanation had 
prevailed before." See Carl Schorske, "The New Rigorism in the Human Sciences, 1940-1960," in 
Daedalus 126, no. I (1997): 295. 
101 Mounce, The Two Pragmatisms, 175. 
102 For an exposition of the transformation of the American philosophical scene during the pre­
World War II years, and an argument denying the sharp break between pragmatism and analytic 
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Similarly, John McCumber argues that pragmatism was simply another victim of 
McCarthyism during the 1950s. He believes that philosophy as an academic discipline 
was a prime target for right-wing Communist hunters because of its reputation for "free 
thinking" and intellectualism. Much more than any other academic discipline, McCumber 
argues, philosophy was at the forefront of attacks: "Philosophy, in fact, may be in first 
place in terms of the percentage of its practitioners who fell afoul of right-wing 
vigilantes... ,,103 The central belief system of the McCarthy era stressed tradition and 
conformity. By its very nature, philosophy was implicitly set against such forms of 
parochialism. Logical Positivism appears to have been the only form of philosophy that 
could conform to the political climate ofthe 1950s. It was scientific, and, therefore, could 
be used as a weapon against communism. Pragmatism, as a philosophy ofuncertainty and 
possibility, did not lend itself as well to 1950s radicalism. 104 
Still to others, pragmatism may have been challenged, but never toppled. Cotkin 
argues that pragmatism withstood the negative forces threatening to sweep away the last 
remnants of the pragmatic tradition in America. He observes that the popular "middle­
ground" pragmatists like Will Durant and Harry Overstreet were able to effectively 
mediate the social and political imperatives of their time because they "communicated 
philosophical knowledge and presented philosophical positions in an ecumenical and 
non-threatening manner.,,105 In so doing, they were able to avoid the charges railed 
philosophy, see Richard Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism," Social Research 59, no. 4 (Winter 
1992): 815-817. 
103 John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 25. 
104 For an insightful piece that illustrates the genesis of the post-World War II radical movements, 
see Victor C. Ferkiss, "Political and Intellectual Origins ofAmerican Radicalism, Right and Left," Annals 
ofthe American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 344 (November 1962): 1-12. 
105 George Cotkin, "Middle-Ground Pragmatists: The Popularization of Philosophy in American 
Culture," Journal ofthe History ofIdeas 55, no. 2 (April 1994): 284. 
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against pragmatism: its loose epistemological standpoint, the lack of a sense of tragedy, 
and the inability to say anything meaningful about the cultural and political happenings 
of the period. Cotkin writes "middle-ground pragmatists believed they could have the 
best ofboth possible worlds ...to be scientific and literary, committed yet distanced, and 
optimistic yet cautious.,,106 
Dickstein observes also that philosophers like Richard J. Bernstein, John E. 
Smith, and John 1. McDermott kept pragmatism alive in college classrooms during the 
107
so-called moribund years of the pragmatic movement. Furthermore, many other 
scholars writing during the post-World War II years saw pragmatism not only as living, 
but flourishing. In his 1950 book The American Mind, historian Henry Steele Commager 
declared that pragmatism was "almost the official philosophy of America."I08 Indeed, 
Commager saw Dewey as maintaining a central role in American life during this period: 
"So faithfully did Dewey live up to his own philosophical creed that he became the guide, 
the mentor, and the conscience of the American people: it is scarcely an exaggeration to 
say that for a generation no major issue was clarified until Dewey had spoken on it."I09 
Accordingly, some view pragmatism as actively resisting the hegemony of Analytic 
philosophy and attacks waged by Marxists and conservatives alike. As a result of such 
thinking, it continued to persist in social discourses throughout the period of its supposed 
106 Cotkin, "Middle-Ground Pragmatists," 295. 
107 Dickstein, The Revival ofPragmatism, 10. 
108 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and 
Character Since the 1880s (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1950), 97. See also Morton White, 
Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism (New York: Viking Press, 1949). White argues 
that pragmatism may have lost some its intellectual influence after World War II, but it did not disappear 
completely. Rather, White observes that pragmatism became one among many brands of intellectual 
perspectives abound in the post-World War II American intellectual scene. 
109 Commager, The American Mind, 100. 
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decline. Yet it had been, to a degree, pushed aside in departments of Philosophy as 
analytic philosophy dominated. 
Revival 
The revival ofpragmatism in American academic discourses is paradoxical on a number 
of levels. Long considered a tenuous and problematic philosophy, pragmatism appeared 
to be outdated and obsolete. Historian David Hollinger observed that, "In 1980, 
"pragmatism" is a concept most American historians have proved they can get along 
without. Some nonhistorians may continue to believe that pragmatism is a distinctive 
contribution of American civilization and somehow emblematic of America, but few 
scholarly energies are devoted to the exploration or even the assertion of this belie£,,11O 
This assessment was premature. A decade and a half later, historian James Kloppenberg 
observed that "pragmatism today is not only alive and well, it is ubiquitous. References to 
pragmatism occur in dizzying frequency from philosophy to social science, from the 
study ofliterature to that ofethnicity, from feminism to legal theory."lll Indeed, 
pragmatism had made its way back, but had arrived in a much different context. The 
American academic and intellectual landscape had been transformed considerably since 
Dewey's death in 1952. Together, Analytic philosophy and postmodemism presented a 
rather unwelcoming intellectual setting for pragmatism to reemerge. 112 
A number of scholars have posited that Analytic philosophy and postmodemism 
provided the necessary conditions for the reemergence of pragmatism. To some, the 
110 David Hollinger, "The Problem of Pragmatism in American History," in The Journal of 
American History 67, no. 1 (June 1980): 88. 
III James T. Kloppenberg, "Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways ofThinking?" in The 
Journal ofAmerican History 83, no. 1 (June 1996): 100-38, at 101. 
112 For critical analyses on the dangers and pitfalls ofanalytic philosophy in American society, see 
William Barrett, The fllusion ofTechnique: A Search for Meaning in a Technological Civilization (Garden 
City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978). 
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unfulfilled promises ofAnalytic philosophy, combined with the challenges set forward by 
French literary critics (and others affiliated with the postmodernist movement), provided 
the optimal conditions for the revival of pragmatism. 113 Analytic philosophy had 
transformed philosophy into something of an enterprise tucked deep within the recesses 
of university buildings. Diggins observes that "analytic philosophy turned the discipline 
into a boring, bloodless affair of academic disputations that inhibited fresh philosophical 
thought.,,114 As it were, Analytic philosophy had ignored the "human factor" for too long: 
the knower-subject was now asking to come back onto the scene. Pragmatism could 
provide for the expansion of philosophy back into more humanistic and pluralistic 
questions. 
Postmodernism threatened to relegate philosophy (and the humanities on the 
whole) to the deconstructionist dustbin. Its preferred targets are things like "authorial 
sovereignty," "grand narratives," "canons," and the agency of the "knowing-subject." 
The revival of pragmatism can be seen as a remedy to the sweeping and far-reaching 
character of postmodernist critiques. To some, pragmatism represents a pre-tested 
American version of postmodernist literary criticism without the destructive potential. 115 
Whereas postmodernism runs the risk of resulting in relativism, or worse nihilism, 
pragmatism always carries an object of affirmation in sight. In a word, pragmatism does 
not carry its anti-essentialism as far as the postmodernist would like to. In this sense, 
113 West, The American Evasion ofPhilosophy, 4. 
114 Diggins, The Promise ofPragmatism, 406. 
115 In his essay "The Resurgence of Pragmatism," Bernstein argues that postmodernism has a 
"gesture of totalizing critique that seeks to expose and mock all norms and standards is self-defeating and 
ends in what Habermas calls 'performative contradiction.'" (839) He believes that the reemergence of 
pragmatism is not a shock because it "fixes" a major deficiency in postmodernist criticisms. For Bernstein, 
postmodernism lacks any "affirmation" out of it's criticism-it simply "mocks all norms." For pragmatists, 
on the other hand, affirmation "has been central to the pragmatic tradition." He concludes that "the reason 
why I think there is now a resurgence of pragmatism and why we are learning anew to appreciate the 
classical pragmatists is because they were way ahead of their times." (839) 
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pragmatism was both a response and mediation in its attempt to ameliorate the problems 
in philosophy during the early 1980s. 
Historian John Pettegrew sees a correlation between the parallel reemergence of 
pragmatism and intellectual history in the 1980s. He observes "One overarching 
explanation for the revivification of American intellectual history and pragmatism as an 
integral part of it is that together they have been adept in explaining historical practice in 
relation to the decentering impulses of postmodemism and the poststructuralist 
destabilization of narrativity and, more fundamentally, the representational capacity of 
language." Pettegrew concludes that "Pragmatism's antifoundationalist and fallibilistic 
premises matched scrupulously with the willingness to apply thought to social situations 
and thereby transitory judgments have served professional historians well over the past 
two decades.,,116 What Pettegrew and others all see is a radical retrieval of the subject 
into the process of inquiry and knowing. Postmodemism has little use for the knowing 
subject. Analytic philosophy aims at objectivity, while postmodemism says that neither 
the knower nor the objects ofknowledge can ever be attained in any "real" form. 
In a sense, then, pragmatism allowed scholars in the early 1980s to mitigate the 
oncoming of postmodemism while alleviating the shortcomings of analytic philosophy. 
To attribute the revival ofpragmatism to anyone ofthese hypotheses would be reductive 
and lacking any practical explanatory value. A more reasonable explanation would 
highlight the confluence of social and intellectual forces that provided the conditions for 
pragmatism to reemerge and once again take hold in intellectual discourses. Although 
116 John Pettegrew, A Pragmatist's Progress?: Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History, 
ed. John Pettegrew (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 8. 
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scholars disagree over the larger forces that came together to revive pragmatism, most 
agree on the main figure involved in its reemergence: Richard Rorty. 
Rorty and the Revival ofPragmatism 
Few people imagined that a veritable dark horse was waiting in the wings to challenge 
the dominance of analytic philosophy in American philosophy.117 Moreover, the 
reemergence of pragmatism was not an obvious choice for intellectual healing during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. However, Richard Rorty, a Princeton professor ofPhilosophy 
at the time, reinvigorated academic interest in the early pragmatists and the American 
philosophical tradition. In so doing, Rorty would spark an internecine debate over what 
pragmatism formerly was, and what it had become. 
When Richard Rorty was in his late teens and early twenties, he grew 
disillusioned with the fundamental basis of the Western philosophical tradition: 
Platonism. He felt that the Platonic search for the transcendental served only to distance 
one further from truth-truth on this model had no functionality because it was set up to 
be perpetually elusive. Rorty, in his autobiographical essay "Trotsky and the Wild 
Orchids," writes: 
I wanted very much to be some kind of Platonist, and from 15 to 20 I did my 
best. But it didn't pan out. I could never figure out whether the Platonic 
117 Indeed, many philosophers and spectators saw analytic philosophy as a thoroughly entrenched 
institution in the late 1970s. Not all were pleased with this institution, though. A telling example of the 
growing dissatisfaction with the dominance of Analytic philosophy was the "Pluralist Revolt" at the 1979 
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division meeting in New York City. Neil Gross reports that 
"the pluralists staged a rally that, on at least one account, was attended by more than 800 people...The next 
day, the highly charged pluralist contingent packed the meeting of the Nominating Committee, and 
nominated from the floor different candidates from those the Committee itselfhad chosen. An election was 
held among those present at the meeting and the result of the vote was that three of the pluralists' non­
analytic candidates were elected to top posts in the APA." Gross, "Richard Rorty's Pragmatism: A Case 
Study in the Sociology ofIdeas," in Theory and Society 32 (2003): 93-148, at 117. The Analytics protested 
the vote, lobbying then President of the Eastern Division Richard Rorty to overturn the outcome. Rorty 
refused. 
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philosopher was aiming at the ability to offer irrefutable argument-argument 
which rendered him able to convince anyone he encountered of what he 
believed...or instead was aiming at a sort of incommunicable, private bliss. 118 
This paradox would follow Rorty throughout his college years and into his first years of 
teaching. However, after chasing down answers, Rorty halted the search. "About 20 years 
or so after I decided that the young Hegel's willingness to stop trying for eternity, and 
just be the child of his time, was the appropriate response to disillusionment with Plato, I 
found myself being led back to Dewey.,,119 This shift, though, was made in a 
philosophical climate where Analytic philosophy was king. 
During the 1960s, Richard Rorty became increasingly dissatisfied with the path 
philosophy in America was going down. The paradigm under which philosophy in 
America operated had become a thoroughly entrenched norm-there was little refutation 
made by contrarians who questioned it. Analytic philosophy demanded serious outlining 
and explication of the core philosophical problems that were to be addressed. 
Accordingly, such a project involved demarcating the types of philosophical problems 
that counted as worthy of investigation, and those that did not. The methodology was 
imported from Logical Positivists: an emphasis on mathematics and logic aimed at 
attaining the relationship between propositions. This methodology was thought to avoid 
the major pitfalls of traditional forms of rationalism and empiricism through the use of 
formal proofs verified by the accepted tools oflogical inquiry. Thus, the paradigm of the 
Logical Positivists was both radically scientific and cogently systematic. 120 
118 Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 9-10. 
119 Ibid., 11-12. 
120 Several important outlines on the major tenets of the Logical Positivist movement include: A.I. 
Ayer, Logical Positivism (New York: Free Press, 1966); Bertrand Russell, "Logical Positivism," in 
Polemic, no. 1 (1945): 6-13; Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1951) and The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems on Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: 
University ofCalifornia Press, 1967). 
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However, it was these features that drove away Rorty. He observes that "by the 
time I had reached the age of 30 Gust about the time of the publication of Kuhn's 
Structure), I had began to doubt whether the creative analytic philosophers, as opposed to 
the hacks, were using anything like an 'analytic method.",I21 The programmatic nature of 
analytic philosophy served to exacerbate Rorty's personal philosophical dilemmas: 
philosophical inquiry had the appearance 0 f hopeless futility, elusiveness, and 
dogmatism. Analytic philosophers proclaimed to be tracking down truth using all the 
latest and greatest tools of logic and mathematics unavailable to Plato, Descartes, Locke 
and Kant. On Rorty's assessment, though, the Analytics perpetually held truth at arm's 
length and never obtained any practical consequences from their inquiries. Although 
analytic philosophy claimed to be doing away with the negative and less fruitful aspects 
of the Western tradition, it was still a task undertaken within the tradition itself-it was 
still in the business 0 f finding foundations 0 f truth. In short, the Analytics still believed in 
epistemology. For Rorty, this had become a search heading down a dead end road. I22 
As Rorty mentioned above, his doubts about Analytic philosophy coincided with 
Thomas Kuhn's publication of The Structures of Scientific Revolutions (1962). The 
connection between Kuhn and Rorty's abandonment of analytic philosophy is not merely 
an arbitrary one. The fallout from the Kuhnian Revolution was felt in most of the major 
disciplines in academia. What Kuhn proposed was that scientists do not have a privileged 
insight to the nature of reality or truth. He maintained that science operates in cycles of 
normally stability, but undergoes periodic paradigm shifts that revise methodologies and 
121 Rorty, "Thomas Kuhn, Rocks, and the Laws ofPhysics," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 178. 
122 For more background on Rorty's abandonment of Analytic philosophy, see Diggins' section 
entitled "Epistemology is Dead, Long Live Pragmatism: Richard Rorty's Quarrel with Philosophy as 
Theory," in The Promise ofPragmatism, 406-17. 
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past theories. On the surface, this assertion appears somewhat harmless; in reality, 
though, it undermines the notion that science operates in the light oftruth and reality. An 
implication of Kuhn's thesis is that science is episodic and plural, operating under 
revisable paradigms at a particular historical moment. 123 Science can no longer be seen 
as a great monolith of truth, but only as a series of episodes throughout history operating 
under various paradigms. 
For Rorty, this conclusion had profound implications for philosophy. Rorty 
reflects that "after reading Structure I began to think of analytic philosophy as one way of 
doing philosophy among others, rather than as the discovery of how to set philosophy on 
the secure path of a science.,,124 Kuhn spoke to Rorty in a way that informed his 
philosophical misgivings about analytic philosophy and the perception of philosophy on 
the whole during the early 1960s. Kuhn's suggestion that science and other academic 
professions are contingent upon accepted paradigms, and, thus, are not plugged into a 
privileged "picture of reality" jibed with Rorty's growing historicism and 
antifoundationalism. For Rorty, Kuhn's pluralist-episodic notion of science could be 
translated into a similar notion of philosophic discourses throughout the Western 
tradition. Rorty concludes that 
Kuhn led me, and many others, to think that instead of mapping culture on to a 
epistemico-ontological hierarchy topped by the logical, objective and scientific, 
and bottoming out in the rhetorical, subjective and unscientific, we should instead 
map culture on to a sociological spectrum ranging from the chaotic left, where 
criteria are constantly changing, to the smug right, where they are, at least for the 
moment, fixed. 125 
123 For a full exposition of Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts and how they come about, see his 
chapter entitled "Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries," in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 3rd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 52-65. An important work that 
examines the impact of the Kuhnian Revolution, see Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History 
for Our Times (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 2000). 
124 Rorty, "Thomas Kuhn, Rocks, and the Laws ofPhysics," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 178. 
125 Ibid., 180. 
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Thus, Kuhn's toppling 0 f the hierarchical and authoritative notions of science leant itself 
to Rorty's own concerns with the ways in which philosophy had been presented 
throughout history. 126 
The searching by philosophers and the privileged picture they supposedly offer 
was fundamentally undermined by Kuhn. So, Rorty gave up the search and moved 
towards edification in philosophy.127 This move entailed abandoning the traditions of 
Carnap and Russell, and adopting Dewey as his new prophet. With the publication of 
Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, Rorty "set down the path of pragmatism, one that 
he has been following for the past twenty years through a body of writing unmatched in 
recent American intellectual history in terms of its mass, critical accessibility, and 
provocation."128 
Published in 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature was a virtual watershed not only 
in American philosophy, but in intellectual circles abroad as well. It grasped the attention 
ofmany critics in the initial years after its publication. As noted above, Rorty had been a 
well-known philosopher of analytic training, so his thesis was seen by many as coming 
out of left field. Any time scholars ofprominence "switch teams," it is bound to create a 
126 For a thorough and informative "sociology of ideas" that examines the influence of Kuhn on 
Rorty during his Princeton years, see Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making ofan American Philosopher 
(Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 2008), 202-216. 
127 The move away from analytic philosophy was not just abstract. At the time, Rorty was teaching 
at Princeton, which was dominated by a climate friendly to Analytic philosophy. Having just published 
Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, Rorty found few intellectual comrades willing to affirm his positions 
taken in the book at Princeton. Unsatisfied with Analytic philosophy and the unfriendly environment at 
Princeton, Rorty took his MacArthur Prize and accepted a professorship at the University of Virginia. 
Perhaps, the ultimate irony may be that Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, the book that made Rorty, 
was published by Princeton University Press. For an insightful account of this move, see Gross, "Richard 
Rorty's Pragmatism," 120-1. 
128 Pettegrew, 9. 
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stir. To some, what Rorty proposes in this text is good news for those that felt smothered 
in the stifling environment of analytic philosophy. To others, Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature represents a threat to the practice of philosophy itself After all, most 
professional philosophers would agree that no epistemology means no philosophy. To 
scholars of classical pragmatism, Rorty's coupling of Dewey with Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger was seen as vulgar and irresponsible. Whether critics affirmed or abhorred 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, one thing can be said for certain: it got people 
talking. 
Writing ill response to Rorty's text, philosopher Charles Taylor remarks that 
''what is exciting and controversial about Rorty's narrative is the sense of a radical new 
departure. What is radical is the promise that we can free ourselves of a whole host of 
questions which have been central to philosophy hitherto.,,129 Taylor carefully articulates 
the central aim of Rorty's argument: philosophy is constrained by the questions it thinks 
it has to ask. For Rorty, the metanarrative of philosophical discourses, inherited from 
Plato and the tradition he helped create, has become obsolete. Rorty's aim "is to 
undermine the.reader's confidence in 'the mind' as something about which one should 
have a 'philosophical' view, in 'knowledge' as something about which there ought to be 
a 'theory' and which has 'foundations,' and in 'philosophy' as it has been conceived 
since Kant.,,130 
From this brief synopsis, we can trace out two major trajectories of Rorty's 
philosophical agenda in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature. First, traditional problems 
129 Charles Taylor, "Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition," in Reading Rorty: Critical Responses 
to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond), ed. Alan R. Malachowski (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1990),258. 
130 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 7. 
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of epistemology and metaphysics-the mind-body problem and the issue of foundations 
of truth, as examples-must be discarded because they are issues no longer useful to 
examine. Second, the traditional philosophical categories of metaphysics, ethics, and 
especially epistemology, reflect the entrenchment of the traditional metanarrative, and 
should be gotten past as well. Rorty believes that philosophy should move away from 
self-identification with truth-seeking and the discovery of absolutes. On his assessment, 
philosophers must become self aware of the socio-historical context in which they are 
theorizing, while simultaneously recognizing the historicity of philosophical theories 
which are thought of as existing outside of time and place. It becomes apparent, then, 
why Rorty chose Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as the "three most important 
philosophers of our century": each of the three became deeply committed to historicist 
and antifoundationalist positions in the latter portion of their careers, which, for Rorty, 
"represented a paradigm shift from the Cartesian-Kantian era.,,131 
Rorty's attack on traditional philosophical categories zeroes in on epistemology. 
In The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, Kuhn argued that scientific discourses operate 
in two distinct ways: normally and abnormally. The former seeks answers to questions in 
an environment where an accepted paradigm is present and agreed upon. That is, an 
agreed upon foundation is available against which problems can be tested, proven, or 
disproven. The latter discourse is revolutionary, ushering in a new paradigm with an 
accompanying domain of new questions and problems. For Rorty, Kuhn's distinction 
between normal and abnormal scientific discourses translates into the philosophical 
distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics. Rorty argues that, similar to normal 
131 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 5; See also Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of 
an American Philosopher, 205. 
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scientific discourses' notions of consensus, epistemology operates under a paradigm of 
"commensurability." He writes that "epistemology proceeds on the assumption that all 
contributions to a given discourse are commensurable...By "commensurable" I mean 
able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be 
reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to 
conflict.,,132 For Rorty, epistemology presupposes the existence of a foundation that 
grounds the criterion of commensuration for a variety of discourses. For an 
epistemologist, this foundation is truth. 
For Rorty, hermeneutics is much more fugitive in its treatment of knowledge. 133 
He argues that it embodies a similar function as Kuhn's abnormal scientific discourse 
does. He observes that "normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-
upon set ofconventions about what counts as answering a question...Abnormal discourse 
is what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these 
conventions or sets them aside.,,134 By its very nature, hermeneutics operates without a 
clear vision of rules that guide inquiry. It has no touchstone to test its objects of inquiry 
against. It views philosophy and epistemology as less a unified formal discourse, or a 
group of discourses, than an ongoing "conversation." Rorty observes that "hermeneutics 
sees the relations between various discourses as those of strands in a possible 
conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the 
speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation 
132 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 316. 
133 Although hermeneutics is a problematic term, I am using it in a strict Rortyian sense. In 
Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, Rorty asserts that his use of "hermeneutics" is "not the name for a 
discipline, nor for a method ofachieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve, nor for a 
program of research. On the contrary, hermeneutics is an expression ofhope that the cultural space left by 
the demise of epistemology will not be filled-that our culture should become one in which the demand for 
constraint and confrontation is no longer felt." (315) 
134 Ibid., 320. 
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lasts.,,135 Hermeneutics, then, is implicitly historicist, pluralistic, and antifoundationalist. 
It is not reduced to a notion that philosophy and epistemology are wedded in a project 
aimed at showing how the mind mirrors nature. Hence, it makes no allusions to 
representation or correspondence that epistemology carries with it. Rorty concludes that 
"if we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an 
attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be 
the critique of all possible forms of social practices.,,136 The emphasis on conversation 
allows Rorty to move beyond the essentialism and foundationalism of traditional 
epistemological methods, while illustrating the historical contingency of language and the 
discourses one chooses to express their knowledge and beliefs. 137 This leads Rorty to a 
position 0 f "epistemo10gical behaviorism." 
Rorty describes his "epistemological behaviorism" as "explaining rationality and 
epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the 
former.,,138 This formulation is radical because it challenges the traditional Kantian 
notion of epistemological representationalism that is the foundation of Analytic 
philosophy. Rorty employs Sellars's attack on the "myth of the given," and Quine's 
challenge to the necessary-contingent distinction to illustrate the social nature of 
135 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 318.
136 Ibid., 171.
137 In a reflection essay entitled "Richard Rorty at Princeton," philosopher Raymond Geuss 
elaborates on the somewhat puzzling affinity Rorty had for Gadamer and his notion of "conversation." 
Geuss held Gadamer to be a "reactionary, distended windbag," who during World War II advocated the 
"New Europe under National Socialism." Raymond Geuss, "Richard Rorty at Princeton: Personal 
Recollections," in Arion 15, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 86. However, for Rorty, Gadamer's notion of cultural 
"conversation" transcended any of his personal and moral shortcomings. Gadamer's "conversation" 
appealed to Rorty's growing frustration with the rife foundationa1ist climate at Princeton during the 1960s. 
Geuss notes that "conversation" is both antiessentialist and based on a historicist conception ofknowledge: 
"'conversation' is to be very explicit about the inherently social nature ofwhat makes us human, and... the 
informality of the use of the word 'conversation' directs attention away from trying to understand this 
activity as the activation ofpre-given formal rules, or as aspiring to satisfy some antecedently given canons 
ofcogency, relevance, or accuracy." (87) 
138 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 174. 
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knowledge and belief In Sellars and Quine, Rorty observes a "commitment to the thesis 
that justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, 
but of conversation, of social practice.,,139 The emphasis on justification in social practice 
provides Rorty with a more holistic view of knowledge, and, hence, allows him to 
abandon any criterion of accuracy associated with epistemological representationalism. 
He argues that "if assertions are justified by society rather than by the characterization of 
the inner representation they express, then there is no point in attempting to isolate 
privileged representations.,,140 Thus, the only criterion of knowledge for Rorty's 
epistemological behaviorism is access to the "rules of the language-game." If we view 
knowledge as justified in a social conversation, then "it will not occur to us to invoke 
either of the traditional Kantian distinctions.,,141 Therefore, without the invocation of 
representationalist epistemological techniques, Rorty concludes that the "notion of the 
mind as Mirror ofNature can be discarded.,,142 
With the mind as Mirror of Nature metaphor abandoned, Rorty argues that 
philosophy should move towards purposes of edification. Using Gadamer's notion of 
"redescription," Rorty articulates edification as "fmding new, better, more interesting, 
more fruitful ways of speaking," to "reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the 
unfamiliar terms of our new inventions.,,143 For Rorty, by its very nature, edification is 
139 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 170. In Truth and Method, Gadamer argues that 
language, not science, is the only means of acquiring truth. He argues that hermeneutics, guided by 
language, puts us in a better position of"knowing" because it does not rely on an exact method for which to 
inquire about truth. This is the case because language is the ubiquitous manifold for which we come know 
things about the world. Hence, language is the starting point from which all inquiries about knowledge 
begin and should be the center ofany theory ofknowledge. See Gadamer's Truth and Method, 2nd Revised 
ed., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, eds. (New York: Continuum, 1994), 164-5,389-405. 
140 Ibid., 174. Rorty's emphasis. 
141 Ibid., 174. 
142 Ibid., 170. 
143 Ibid., 360. 
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revolutionary: in Kuhn's terms, it is articulated in an abnormal discourse, for it is "the 
power of strangeness" that enables the shedding of "our old selves...to aid us in 
becoming new beings.,,144 In order to create new words and utterances to redescribe 
ourselves, the discourse to articulate such a vocabulary would, necessarily, need to be of 
a different and new brand than that of the normal discourse. The new terms in which to 
redescribe the familiar are non-conformists and subversive, thus, the language used to 
describe the new and novel cannot be that which reflects the conformity of normal 
discourse. Hence, for Rorty, it requires an openness to new ways of thinking and 
speaking to overcome the traditions ofphilosophy that are no longer useful. 145 
If edification requires an abnormal, revolutionary discourse to redescribe our 
familiar mode ofbeing, then Rorty believes a certain attitude is required on the part ofthe 
philosopher. He observes that the edifYing "peripheral, pragmatic philosophers are 
skeptical primarily about systematic philosophy, about the whole project of universal 
commensuration...they make fun ofthe classic picture ofman, the picture which contains 
systematic philosophy, the search for universal commen~uration in a fmal vocabulary.,,146 
In undermining systematic philosophy, "great edifYing philosophers [like Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, and Dewey] destroy for the sake of their own generation...to keep space open 
for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause--wonder that there is 
something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation ofwhat 
was already there.,,147 Without the mind as Mirror or Nature, Rorty sees the hope of 





plurality and new ways of describing ourselves that move beyond the normal discourse 
provided by the traditional Western conception ofphilosophy and epistemology. 
Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature not only provides a hopeful vision of post-
epistemology philosophy, it is also a historical narrative of the Western philosophical 
tradition. Much like Dewey's attempt in Reconstruction in Philosophy, Rorty in 
Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature portends an account of the origins of the tradition. 
Both Dewey and Rorty found the historicist approach to be of crucial import in 
philosophical inquiry: to understand the origins of a philosophical problem, the historical 
roots ofthe dilemma must be uncovered. 148 Both men believed that philosophical theories 
and methodologies contain a sociological dimension that is implicit to philosophical 
doctrines. The notion, then, of there being philosophical theories that exist in a vacuum 
apart from a socio-historical context is untenable for both Dewey and Rorty. Rather, 
philosophy represents the needs and concerns of people in a specific context at a certain 
historical moment. For Dewey and Rorty, the story of philosophy is not one of the 
perennial investigations of the same core of "foundational" problems; rather, philosophy 
is a story of intellectual responses to human needs and desires throughout history. 
The socio-historical dimensions of Dewey's and Rorty's philosophy are quite 
similar. In his discussion of the origins of philosophy, Dewey argues that the tradition is 
constructed of various images and symbols that are less scientific than they are 
emotional. That is, the history of philosophy reflects more of the temperaments of those 
148 By historicism, I do not intend to imply the somewhat radical position maintained by some 
post-structuralists and other cultural relativists who argue that historical periods exist in random isolation. 
The use I have in mind is a strict awareness of the various historical contingencies that affect thought 
during a given moment in history. For Dewey and Rorty, philosophical thought is deeply entangled in the 
social context in which it arises. Indeed, for all the pragmatists, awareness of historical time did not 
necessarily entail relativity ofknowledge. 
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who construct the problems, rather than perpetual problems that anse from so-called 
foundational investigation. 149 Dewey writes: 
To treat the early beliefs and traditions of mankind as if they were attempts at 
scientific explanation of the world, only erroneous and absurd attempts, is thus to 
be guilty ofa great mistake. The material out ofwhich philosophy fmally emerges 
is irrelevant to science and to explanation. It is figurative, symbolic of fears and 
hopes, made of imaginations and suggestions, not significant of a world of 
objective fact intellectually confronted. It is poetry and drama, rather than 
. 150
sCIence... 
Philosophy and the Mirror o/Nature shares a common vision with Dewey ofphilosophy 
as historically-contingent stories shot through with literary metaphor, not true pictures of 
reality. Rorty describes what he sees the history ofphilosophy encompassing: 
It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which 
determines most of our philosophical convictions. The picture which holds 
traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing 
valuable representations-some accurate, some not-and capable of being 
studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as mirror, 
the notion ofknowledge as accuracy of representation would not have 
suggested itself 151 
Thus, both Rorty and Dewey see philosophy built not on an objective foundation that 
represents a clear explication of reality. 152 Rather, philosophy is figurative, symbolic, 
149 This statement is not meant to imply that Dewey found science to have serious shortcomings. It 
is well known that Dewey worshipped science and all the possibilities it held for mankind. In the context of 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey is critiquing the ways in which philosophical "problems" have been 
articulated in the past. His criticisms centers on the fact that what those philosophizing in the past took to 
be the 'pure philosophical problems' "originated not out of intellectual material, but out of social and 
emotional material." Reconstructions in Philosophy, 25. Seen in this light, philosophical problems 
established 2000, 200, or 20 years ago reflect more of social and historical interests, than they do methods 
of rigorous scientific investigation. 
150 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 7.
151 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 12.
152 The connection that I am proposing here-one in vision-is not outlandish. On many
occasions, Rorty credited Dewey with influencing the questions that he asked and the conclusions he would 
draw. For example, Rorty said in 1985 that "For some years, whenever I thought I had something general 
or useful to say, it sounded like an echo of something I had once read. When I tried to run it down, I was 
constantly led back to Dewey." See Richard Rorty, "Comments on Sleeper and Edel," in Transactions of 
the Charles S. Peirce Society 21, no. 1 (1985): 39. Neil Gross makes a similar connection. He posits a 
direct link between Rorty's "sociologization" and Dewey. Gross observes "Dewey...had viewed 
philosophy through a sociological lens. Indeed, especially given the affective connection to Dewey that 
Rorty felt, it would have been strange for him to re-read books like Reconstruction in Philosophy-his 
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comprised ofpictures of what reality is metaphorically made out to be. Therefore, the 
legacy inherited from Descartes and Kant is a story 0 f reality created from imagination 
and memory. Taken together, these are developed into pictures of philosophical reality. 
What is missing, though, from Dewey's and Rorty's assessment is the notion of 
correspondence between the mind and the world. This, perhaps, is the most lasting legacy 
inherited from both men's reworking ofthe history ofthe Western tradition. 
Rorty's celebration of pragmatism comes out most clearly in his next book, The 
Consequences ofPragmatism. In this collection of essays, Rorty outlines what he sees as 
the utility of pragmatism to remedy the loss of the mirror of philosophy-the 
"consequences of pragmatism". Although Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature attacks 
analytic philosophy, it is not yet debunked by an explicit pragmatist line of 
argumentation. IS3 This said, it is here where Rorty sketches out his formulation of the 
history ofpragmatism, what it entails to be a "pragmatist," and what the consequences of 
pragmatism are for analytic philosophy. 
The unifying thread that ties each essay together is a consistent identification 
made by Rorty between philosophers ofthe Platonic and Kantian schools, and pragmatic 
philosophers. The former, as Rorty sees it, view philosophy "as a name for the study of 
problems which any attempt at vision must confront: problems which professors of 
philosophy have a moral obligation to continue working on, whatever their current 
favorite book-and not come to the conclusion that there were fundamental similarities between his 
philosophy and Dewey's own." See Neil Gross, "Richard Rorty's Pragmatism", 121. 
153 Gross observes that "despite his attachment to Dewey, however, and articulation of a 
conception of truth that arguably owed more to the tradition ofclassical American pragmatism than to any 
other, Rorty was not at great pains in [Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature] to label himself a pragmatist, 
at one point passing up the opportunity to do so on the grounds that the term had become'a bit overladen. '" 
See Gross, RichardRorty: The Making ofan American Philosopher, 21. 
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preoccupations.,,154 The latter, who Rorty is sympathetic towards, "is dominated by a 
sense of the contingency of history, the contingency of the vocabulary which he himself 
is using, the sense that nature and scientific truth are largely beside the point and that 
history is up for grabs.,,155 To be sure, on Rorty's historicist criterion of pragmatism, 
many a philosopher would qualify as a pragmatist. However, Rorty clearly has Dewey in 
view in Consequences ofPragmatism. 
Rorty's assessment of American pragmatism is sweepmg. Rorty explains that 
pragmatism as a theory "says that truth is notthe sort ofthing one should expect to have a 
philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, ''truth'' is just the name of a 
property which all true statements share.,,156 Setting pragmatism against the Western 
philosophical tradition, Rorty argues that ''the pragmatist sees no need to worry about 
whether Plato or Kant was right in thinking that something nonspatio-temporal made 
moral judgments true, nor about whether the absence of such a thing means that such 
judgments are 'merely expressions of emotion' or 'merely conventional' or 'merely 
subjective. ",157 Furthermore, Rorty believes pragmatism to be more radical in implication 
than Logical Positivism: "[The pragmatist] shares with the positivist the Baconian and 
Hobbesian notion that knowledge is power, a tool for coping with reality. But he carries 
this Baconian point through to its extreme, as the positivist does not. He drops the notion 
154 Richard Rotty, "Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay ofWittgenstein," in The Consequences of 
Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980 (Minneapolis, MN: University ofMinnesota Press, 1982),31. 
155 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," in The Consequences ofPragmatism, 228-9. 
Throughout Rorty's works, I believe, he has two sorts of philosophers in mind. The first type is the 
philosopher engaged in traditional philosophical discourses-those of the normal discourse. They are 
conservative in approach and believe that value still exists in epistemology and traditional philosophical 
methodologies, and that consensus can be attained. The second type is the radical, avant garde philosopher 
who rejects the normal discourse by engaging in an abnormal discourse. It is clear that Rorty prefers the 
latter who, along with him, pelt the mirror ofnature with hermeneutic rocks. 
156 Richard Rorty, "Introduction," in The Consequences ofPragmatism, xiii. 
157 Ibid., xvi. 
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of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that modem science does not 
enable us to cope because it corresponds." I58 Taken on the whole, Rorty paints the history 
ofpragmatism with broad strokes. To many, such a method distorts the major differences 
between the early pragmatists and his brand of philosophy. 159 Rorty appears self-serving 
in his assessment of the historical tenets of pragmatism so as to allow for conformity of 
the tradition to his own philosophical agenda. This bending is seen as vulgar and 
intellectually careless, leading to the charge of anachronistic scholarship. This issue will 
be addressed in detail below. 
It is also in Consequence ofPragmatism where Rorty extrapolates the reasons for 
his affmity for Dewey. Earlier in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, Rorty declares 
that ''the three most important philosophers of our century... [are] ...Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, and Dewey. Each tried, in his early years, to find a new way of making 
philosophy "foundational"-a new way of formulating an ultimate context for 
thought.,,160 However, Rorty observes that in each of their later works, a consistent 
moving away from foundationalism can be found. He argues that ''their later work is 
therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the 
reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply him with a new 
158 Rorty, "Introduction," in The Consequences ofPragmatism, xvii. 
159 Many major scholars ofearly pragmatism criticize the historical accuracy ofRorty' s account of 
pragmatism. See Thomas Alexander, "John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty 
toward a Postmodern Ethics," in Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 29 (1993): 369-400; 
Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of ModernitylPostmodernity 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Brodsky, "Rorty's Interpretation of Pragmatism"; James Campbell, 
"Rorty's Use of Dewey"; James Gouinlock, "What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty's 
Interpretation of Dewey," in Journal of the History of Philosophy 28, no. 2 (April 1990): 251-69; Ralph 
Sleeper, "Rorty's Pragmatism: Afloat in Neurath's Boat, But Why Adrift?" in Transactions of the Charles 
Sanders Peirce Society 21 (1985): 9-20 and The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of 
Philosophy; John Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 1987) and Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and the Future of Philosophy (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2003). 
160 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 5. 
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philosophical program.,,161 A reader, though, finds in Consequences ofPragmatism Rorty 
moving even farther beyond edification as an element of the criterion of antifoundational 
philosophy. Whereas Rorty's champions in Philosophy and the Mirror were those that 
embodied a revolutionary spirit in their attacks on traditional philosophy, his 
antifoundationalist/historicist criterion becomes much stricter in his second book. 
Rorty's growing emphasis on historicism leads him to attack Heidegger's 
historicism as inadequate when compared with Dewey. In "Overcoming the Tradition," 
Rorty observes that "Heidegger...thinks of philosophy-of Thought as opposed to 
ontology-as something which might be recaptured... The whole force of Heidegger's 
thought lies in his account of the history of philosophy.,,162 While Rorty finds 
Heidegger's historicism both appropriate and necessary for the overcoming of the 
negative aspects of the philosophical tradition he inherits, he argues that Heidegger does 
not take it far enough. Again, Rorty's aim in this text is to demarcate the philosophers 
and philosophies that still hold onto the tradition, and those who successfully move 
beyond it. He believes that Heidegger's historicism is hopelessly rooted in the tradition it 
seeks to overcome. Hence, on Rorty's assessment, his formulations are self-refuting: 
Heidegger's attachment to the notion of "philosophy"-the pathetic notion that 
even after metaphysics goes, something called ''Thought'' might remain-is 
simply the sign of Heidegger's own fatal attachment to the tradition: the last 
infirmity of the greatest of the German professors...No matter how much 
Heidegger seems to have overcome our professional urge to compete with the 
great dead philosophers on their own ground, no matter how much he may try to 
distance himself from the tradition...he is still insistent that the tradition offered 
us ''words of Being." He still thinks that the place where philosophy was is the 
place to be. 163 
161 Ibid., 5-6. 
162 Richard Rorty, "Overcoming the Tradition," in The Consequences ofPragmatism, 52. Rorty's 
emphasis. 
163 Ibid., 52. 
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It is only with Dewey, then, that Rorty locates a philosopher who is willing to abandon 
the tradition. 
As shown above, Rorty argues that Heidegger's historicism is deficient in that his 
antifoundationalism was still grounded in the traditions and language of earlier 
philosophy. For Rorty, this tendency exists for a single reason: "Heidegger's weakness 
was that he could not escape the notion that philosophers' difficulties are more thanjust 
philosophers' difficulties.,,164 He asserts that Dewey does not succumb to the constraints 
of the tradition. Dewey does not, as Rorty argues, bow to the obsolete monolith of 
philosophy as Heidegger does. In so doing, Dewey's historicism is far more radical in its 
consequences and implications. 
Rorty believes that Dewey successfully moves beyond the tradition because he 
grounds his inquiries in concerns for the "problems of men." Rorty argues that "Dewey 
found what he wanted in turning away from philosophy as a distinctive activity 
altogether, and towards the ordinary world-the problems of men, freshly seen by 
discarding the distinctions which the philosophical tradition has developed.,,165 To be 
sure, Dewey sought to conflate facts and values, science and ethics under the banner of 
pragmatism. On Rorty's assessment, then, the calculated effort made by Dewey to 
discard such distinctions provides a more radical and cutting philosophy that is conscious 
of the social and historical elements that constitute a given philosophy during a given 
period. Thus, the move that allows Dewey to free himself from the tradition is the 
destruction of the fact/value dichotomy and the conceptualization of philosophy as 
addressing the "problems ofmen." 
164 Rorty, "Overcoming the Tradition," 54.
165 Ibid., 53.
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A consistent feature of Rorty's fIrst two major works (if not all of his works) is his 
tendency to reduce a problem to two opposing sides, align with one of them, and then 
brush aside the opposition. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty demarcates 
between philosophy that takes part in the normal discourse, epistemology, and the 
vanguard philosophy that employs an abnormal discourse, hermeneutics. In so doing, 
philosophers that still place value on epistemology are labeled foundationalists because 
of the representationalism that is associated with Kantian epistemology. Those that 
shattered the Mirror ofNature metaphor-the Wittgensteins, Heideggers, and Deweys of 
the philosophy world-are hailed as rebels who had the fortitude to acknowledge the 
uselessness of an obsolete tradition. Similarly, in Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty 
delineates between those who continue to maintain a philosophy based in the Platonic 
and Kantian traditions, and the pragmatists. Rorty notes the pervasiveness of the former 
tradition, then sets out on an antifoundationalist road, denouncing the foundationalists 
along the way. Richard Bernstein describes this persistent "either/or" as "Cartesian 
Anxiety"-the tendency to reduce every problematique to a dualism. 166 If the classical 
pragmatists sought to collapse as many of the traditional dualisms and dichotomies of 
their day in the name ofpluralism, then does Rorty create a contradiction by reinforcing 
the foundational-antifoundational dichotomy? Indeed, a major theme among the early 
pragmatists was that of consensus-based problem solving. Pierce, James, and Dewey all 
emphasized the notion of fallibilism and group testing of ideas. Does Rorty's continual 
dichotomization of those that maintain and uphold the Western philosophical traditions, 
166 See Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivity and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 18. For an extended discussion on Rorty's use of dualisms and how they hurt 
his pragmatism, see Cull, "The Betrayal ofPragmatism? Rorty's Quarrel with James," 87-9. 
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and those that move past it, make it seem that consensus cannot be achieved? These 
questions illustrate but a few of the many charges leveled against Rorty's pragmatism. 
They show why many observers believe that R9rty fundamentally distorts the pragmatist 
tradition and does a disservice by identifying himself as such. These issues will be 
examined more fully below. 
Good Rorty, Bad Rorty: Rortyand the Pragmatist Tradition167 
John Patrick Diggins observes that "where most philosophers believed it necessary to 
move beyond pragmatism, Rorty argued that it was necessary to return to it.,,168 In the 
context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Rorty viewed analytic philosophy as having 
had its run, leaving its promise of clarity and a broader understanding of the fundamental 
philosophical issues largely unfulfilled. Although this contention is debatable, most 
would agree that philosophy had become the enterprise that had underwritten the projects 
ofmodem epistemology. On the whole, philosophy and philosophers were still operating 
under the traditional paradigm of Western philosophy that began with Plato and was 
reinforced by Kant. This paradigm prescribed that philosophy was to engage in the 
uncovering of "foundations of knowledge" which would lead to the discovery of "truth." 
It was during this time that Rorty suggested that such quests were the residue of an 
accepted paradigm that needed to be overcome. What was needed was a pragmatic shift 
that embraced uncertainty in a world without any guarantee of foundations ofknowledge 
or truth. With the mind as Mirror of Nature shattered, Rorty pushed pragmatism as the 
167 This is a reference to Rorty's essay "Philosophy in America Today," in Consequences of 
Pragmatism. Here, Rorty delineates between "Good Dewey" and "Bad Dewey." The former refers to the 
Dewey that is antifoundational, antirealist, and antimetaphysical. The larter refers to the more 
metaphysically-inclined Dewey, most explicitly in Experience and Nature. See Consequences of 
Pragmatism 211-14. 
168 Diggins, The Promise ofPragmatism, 407. 
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only alternative. Rorty's choice in taking a pragmatist position afforded him the comfort 
ofbelieving ''what we cannot know we need not worry about. No truth, no sweat.,,169 
The revival of pragmatism created a controversy among scholars of pragmatism, 
as well as among intellectual historians, philosophers, and social critics. The central issue 
at hand is whether Rorty's "pragmatism" is really pragmatism. This issue soon created a 
gulf between those that agreed with Rorty, and those who saw him as threatening the 
tradition. To understand the issues that divide Rorty into the "good" and the "bad," a look 
into the historiographical debate will be beneficial. 
Many observers view Rorty positively for the good he has done in revitalizing the 
pragmatist movement. The good Rorty is the one that brought pragmatism back into 
academic discourses and got people talking about pragmatism during the early 1980s. In 
so doing, he renewed interest in an American intellectual tradition that he believes offers 
valuable insights for present philosophical and moral questions. Also, he successfully 
brought the history of philosophy back into Philosophy departments as an essential 
element of curriculum. The historical sweep ofphilosophy's past was once again seen as 
important. These achievements would be readily agreed upon by most observers 
regardless of one's personal thoughts on Rorty's position in the pragmatist tradition. 17o 
However, the unanimity ends here. 
Some take a strong position in their endorsement of Rorty. They argue that 
Rorty's pragmatism does not misappropriate the tradition and see nothing wrong with his 
taking the 'linguistic tum.' In so doing, it served to validate Rorty's self-identification as 
169 Diggins, The Promise ofPragmatism, 407. 
170 See Dickstein, The Revival of Pragmatism, 9-17. See also Westbrook, John Dewey and 
American Pragmatism, 539-42. This is meant to say that even Rorty's strongest critics would agree that he 
played an integral part in the revival ofAmerican pragmatism, which was ofpositive benefit. 
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a pragmatist. For example, intellectual historian David Harlan argues that there is nothing 
wrong with Rorty's use of the pragmatist tradition. Speaking in terms of the history of 
ideas, Harlan observes that Rorty "gives up any pretense of discovering 'what really 
happened' in the past.,,171 Harlan believes that Rorty is well justified in giving up on a 
''true account" of pragmatism and, specifically, Dewey's philosophical intentions. This 
justification centers on what constitutes an intellectual historian and how the history of 
ideas operates as a discipline. For Harlan, intellectual historians practicing in the 
postmodem academic setting must abandon the notion of objectivity in their work and 
come to recognize the moral nature of their undertakings. That is, intellectual history is a 
story of picking and choosing a disciple and putting them to use to explain the processes 
of coming to know ourselves in the present. Harlan argues that Rorty "does not want to 
explain the origins of Dewey's ideas; he wants to employ them...He is not trying to 
explain how the past flowed into the present; he is trying to ransack the past for images, 
metaphors, ideas-anything that can cast new light on the present.,,172 Rorty, then, 
chooses Dewey as his disciple from whom he will construct an intellectual narrative in 
which to purport his own views. In Harlan's view, Rorty is justified to do so since 
intellectual history is implicitly a moral activity: his choosing Dewey involves a value 
judgment as to who would make a suitable intellectual predecessor to inform his own 
philosophy. 
171 David Harlan, The Degradation of American History (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1997), 154. 
172 Ibid., 154. Harlan has been attacked by a few historians of notable standing for his views on 
intellectual history and the role of postmodern techniques in historical inquiry. For a particularly strong 
exchange, see David Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," and David A. Hollinger, 
"The Return to the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical Knowing," in The American Historical Review 
94, no. 3 (June 1989): 581-621. For a third party commentary on this exchange, see Joyce Appleby, "One 
Good Tum Deserves Another: Moving beyond the Linguistic; A Response to David Harlan," in The 
American Historical Review 94, no. 5 (December 1989): 1326-1332. 
75 
Harlan is not alone in defending Rorty and his self-identification with the 
pragmatist tradition. Neil Gross argues that although Rorty's historical account of 
pragmatism is problematic in a number of ways, his intentions were pure in its revival. 
That is, Rorty did not set out to undermine a rich tradition for his own purposes. More 
specifically, Rorty's self-identification with the pragmatic tradition can be explained by 
examining Rorty's background. He argues that Rorty's 'pragmatist tum' was the result of 
several "socio-biographical" experiences: "the self-concept of a leftist American patriot, 
and that of a philosopher attuned to the ways in which philosophical inquiry is shaped by 
the social and historical settings where it occurS.,,173 On this line, Rorty's leftist 
upbringing (with Dewey as his family's central prophet) and his growing disdain for 
analytic philosophy account for his "falling in love" with pragmatism. 174 Combined, 
Rorty was predisposed to a "sociological understanding of philosophy" where the 
philosopher is never detached from her or his social and historical context (and, therefore, 
from the "problems of men"). Gross observes that, for Rorty, "philosophy emerges in 
response to felt societal needs, originally coming into being in response to the crisis 
traditional societies experience when, due especially to advances in science and technical 
knowledge, alternatives to customary ways of life come into view.,,175 Gross argues that 
this sociological minded philosophy is consistent with Dewey's own perspective on the 
function ofphilosophy in a community. He asserts that "Dewey insisted that as a society 
changes, changes also occur in both the problems philosophers are asked to address and 
173 Neil Gross, "Richard Rorty's Pragmatism," 94. 
174 Hans Joas offers an insightful essay on the intimate appeal ofpragmatism to the disillusioned 
intellectual. See "The Inspiration of Pragmatism: Some Personal Remarks," in Dickstein, The Revival of 
Pragmatism, 190-8. 
175 Gross, "Richard Rorty's Pragmatism," 121. 
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the answers to those problems they are likely to give.,,176 Thus, Gross sees both Rorty and 
Dewey sharing a sociological understanding of philosophy that recognizes the social and 
historical context in which their practice is developed and unfolds. For Rorty, Dewey 
served as a model to nurture his leftist concerns for social justice and his intellectual 
prowess for historicism in philosophizing. It is, then, that Rorty has not missed the mark 
by much in his attachment to Dewey. 177 
For many other scholars, though, these defenses of Rorty simply do not hold. 
Critics argue that Rorty espouses a pragmatism that is simply an old name for some new 
ways of thinking. 178 This is the bad Rorty. The bad Rorty's pragmatism is that which 
extols language at the cost ofexperience. The exorcism ofexperience that Rorty performs 
illustrates the profound difference between his pragmatism and the "pure" classical 
tradition of pragmatism. The bad Rorty reduces knowledge to conversation. 179 The hard-
line stance of bad Rorty against any hint of foundationalism fundamentally distorts the 
pluralism of the early pragmatists. 180 The ironism of bad Rorty sacrifices the social for 
176 Gross, "Richard Rorty's Pragmatism," 121. 
177 Catkin believes that an argument can be made for an affinity between James and Rorty. He 
asserts that both James and Rorty share similar sentiments on the utility ofpluralism, the power ofromantic 
thinking, and the inevitability of a tragic side of life. See Catkin, "William James and Richard Rorty: 
Context and Conversation," 38-9. 
178 In his article "Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?", Kloppenberg 
attacks Rorty for doing just this. Kloppenberg argues that Rorty neglects Dewey's challenge on ethics and 
too quickly dismisses his call for philosophy to act as social critic. Kloppenberg concludes that "Rorty's 
position is insufficiently pragmatic...his liberal ironism encourages selfishness, cynicism, and resignation 
by undercutting efforts to confront the hard facts ofpoverty and greed." (125) 
179 See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 197-207. Bernstein is critical ofRorty's 
attempt in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature to deny that he is "laying the foundations for a new type of 
philosophy." Bernstein believes that reducing knowledge to conversation is a feeble way ofavoiding such 
"constructive" charges which would lead to foundationalist implications. Illustrating Rorty's elusiveness, 
Bernstein observes that "every time we think we can really pin him down, he nimbly dances to another 
place and introduces a new set ofdistinctions." (202) 
180 See Cull, "The Betrayal ofPragmatism?: Rorty's Quarrel with James," 83-95. 
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private play.I81 More strongly, some label Rorty not as a pragmatist, but a relativist 
whose antifoundationalism fundamentally undermines his philosophical project. 182 
A formidable challenge that unifies many of the attacks against Rorty is his use of 
Dewey. It is argued that Rorty's co-opting of Dewey is, at best, a misguided attempt to 
link himself to the pragmatist tradition, an attempt that misuses and misrepresents the 
central aims of classical pragmatism, and that does a fundamental disservice to the 
contemporary pragmatic movement. Ralph Sleeper argues that Rorty's pragmatism "is all 
too deconstructionist" and that he "seems to be trying to play the game without any rules 
at all, or as ifwe could just make them up as we go along.,,183 Sleeper asserts that Rorty's 
emphasis on ''the qualitative uniqueness of every new situation and upon the futility of 
trying to establish some permanent matrix," goes against Dewey's entire conception of 
"situations." He asserts that "'precariousness,' 'stability,' and 'qualitative individuality' 
are just those traits that Dewey says are 'generic' features of our environment, features 
that help us understand both why 'inquiry' is necessary and why it is possible... and why 
'epistemology' must be rescued from the camp of the positivists and put back into the 
service of the 'problems of men. ",184 It is for these reasons that Sleeper disagrees with 
Rorty's pragmatism. 
Abraham Edel argues that Rorty "softened the notion ofknowledge" so much that 
he neglects the early pragmatists' emphasis on the "growth of knowledge." He asserts 
that Rorty's obsession with "overcoming" the tradition carries with it contradictory aims 
181 See Cotkin, "William James and Richard Rorty: Context and Conversation," 48-52. 
182 The figure most often associated with this position is Hilary Putnam. For Putnam, Rorty's 
antifoundationalism undermines his view ofknowledge, which leads to a position ofrelativism. As a result, 
his relativism translates into doubts about the possibility of knowledge at all. For Putnam, this leads to an 
interminable position of irrationalism. See Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 103-26. 
183 R W. Sleeper, "Rorty's Pragmatism: Afloat in Neurath's Boat, But Why Adrift," 12, 14. 
184 Ibid., 15. 
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to those ofDewey. For Dewey, Edel observes, the goal ofknowledge was to enable us to 
be in better positions to judge what is better from what is worse (philosophically, 
scientifically, ethically, etc.). Ede1 concludes that "instead oflooking to overcoming the 
tradition we had better think in terms of long-range philosophical experiments and the 
criteria for their assessment.,,185 
James Gouinlock argues that Rorty's self-description as a "Deweyan" is a vulgar 
misappropriation. Gouinlock argues that Rorty's reconfiguration of Dewey's intellectual 
legacy results in the rejection of ''what was surely dearest to Dewey himself.,,186 
Specifically, he argues that Rorty's appraisal ofthe "bad" Dewey ignores the centrality of 
metaphysics in Dewey's philosophy. Gouinlock identifies Dewey's works that address 
metaphysics, Experience and Nature and Logic: The Theory ofInquiry, as the works that 
are most "precious in his heritage." He argues that these works define "Dewey's 
uppermost concern and guiding aim as a philosopher: the commitment to a methodic 
social reconstruction.,,187 Accordingly, Gouinlock observes that "Dewey's metaphysics is 
an attempt to characterize the inclusive context of human existence in such a way that we 
may learn how to function in it as effectively as possible...This vision is unrecognizable 
in Rorty, where nature is and must be a meaningless cipher.,,188 Rorty's dismissal of the 
18S Abraham Edel, "A Missing Dimension in Rorty's Use of Pragmatism," in Transactions of the 
Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 (1985): 22. 
186 James Gouinlock, "What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism?" 251. A similar argument is made 
by Garry Brodsky. He argues that Rorty's behaviorist-historicist epistemology is incompatible with 
Dewey's naturalist epistemology. He observes that "Dewey argues that if we take biological psychology 
seriously we uncover a generic form of human behavior,-a kind of dynamic groping and coping with the 
environment in the course of responding to its stimuli and recovering a dynamic equilibrium with it­
which manifests itself in one or another way in the various modes of human life." This is a crucial caveat 
for Dewey's notion of social reconstruction and it serves to contradict Rorty's account ofknowledge that is 
"what society lets us say." See Garry Brodsky, "Rorty's Interpretation ofPragmatism," 332. 
18? Ibid., 252. 
188 Ibid., 266. 
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"bad" Dewey, the one that had the tendency of "backsliding" into metaphysics, loses 
sight of ''the only Dewey." 
Susan Haack has been one ofthe most virulent critics ofRorty. In Manifesto ofa 
Passionate Moderate, Haack observes that "somehow classical pragmatism, in the form 
of Peirce's aspiration to renew philosophy by making it more scientific has been 
transmuted into the vulgar pragmatism fashionable today.,,189 She is troubled by "Rorty's 
hopes of a post-philosophical culture in which "we pragmatists" give up the old-
fashioned idea that truth is a goal of inquiry, and remake philosophy as a genre of 
literature, just a kind of writing." Haack argues that "playfulness has its price.. .literary 
dilettantism of Rortyesque neo-pragmatism is crippled by its disastrous inability even to 
acknowledge the truths that literature can teach us." She also thinks that Rorty's 
conflation of science and literature "is bizarre," in that he makes the mistake of 
concluding that "because scientific inquiry often involves linguistic shifts and 
innovations and relies on metaphors, science is really a genre ofliterature.,,190 From all of 
this, Haack concludes that Rorty misses the point of the early pragmatists, and 
fundamentally skews the legacy which he claims as his own. 
One can begin to see in the historiographical overview the polemical effect ofRorty. This 
is important, for the "pragmatist tum" made by Rorty and the effective revival represents 
a crucial moment in the history of American pragmatism. Although he is credited with 
revival, this does not entail a position ofleadership among those who identify themselves 
as "neopragmatists." From the outset, he served as a divisive figure: some would be 
189 Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays (Chicago: The 
University ofChicago Press, 1998),2. 
190 Ibid., 2. 
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drawn to his linguistic pragmatism, while others took up more reactionary and defensive 
positions against him. This point deserves extrapolation. From my perspective, the 
controversy created by Rorty's "pragmatist tum" illustrates two important points about 
the legacy 0 f pragmatism: first, for those that are sympathetic to Rorty's pragmatism, an 
implicit flexibility can be found in the tradition of pragmatism that makes room for his 
"linguistic tum." On this view, pragmatism can be embodied in a number of positions, 
while staying true to the "spirit" of the tradition. Second, for those that find Rorty's self­
identification with pragmatism problematic, it is presupposed that a unified tradition with 
certain "core ideals" exists. That is, something that is "classical pragmatism" can be 
located and identified. Hence, Rorty's historical reinterpretation distorts the tradition. 
Where one sits on this issue determines how they perceive Rorty's pragmatism and his 
place in the tradition. 
Is Rorty guilty of historical inaccuracy? If so, does it damage his pragmatist 
credentials? Perhaps a foreboding warning in Pragmatism, James writes "Woe to him 
whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; 
they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.,,191 Although James is writing 
in the context of truth and ofour judgments ofreality, his message can be aptly applied to 
the examination 0 f Rorty and his treatment 0 f the history 0 f pragmatism. The generally 
accepted accusation against Rorty is well worn: Rorty's critics charge him with jumping 
on board the pragmatist band wagon during the 1970s and early 1980s to distance himself 
from analytic philosophy. On this line, pragmatism provided him the philosophical 
justification for making this departure. That is, pragmatism provided him with the 
arguments necessary to strip himself of the analytic tradition that he was trained in and 
19! James, Pragmatism, 205. 
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associated with in the early years of his career. By aligning himself with the tradition, so 
say his critics, he distorts many of the fundamental features of the American 
philosophical legacy. In so doing, his "pragmatism" is not really pragmatism. Thus, to 
use James's words, Rorty has played it fast and loose with the historical facts of the 
pragmatist traditions. 
However, to sympathize with his critics, or apologists, is abiding to and 
perpetuating the either/or polemic that defines the controversy. Rorty's linguistically-
based pragmatism appears to take him places the pragmatists, specifically Dewey, would 
not or cannot go. For Rorty's critics, his commitment to antifoundationalism requires a 
reworking of Dewey that divides his pragmatism into two parts: a good side and a bad 
side. Still more, reducing knowledge to linguistic agreement appears to lend itself to 
charges of relativism and subjectivism. Taken together, Rorty's pragmatism does appear 
to deviate from the historical facts of the tradition. Indeed, Rorty himself recognizes the 
differences between his pragmatism and that of his predecessors. He describes his 
pragmatism as "a fairly simple, albeit sketchy, outline," that "makes no pretence ofbeing 
faithful to the thoughts of either James or Dewey (much less Peirce, whom I barely 
mention).,,192 Instead, Rorty's pragmatism involves "idiosyncratic...restatements of 
Jamesian and Deweyan themes.,,193 As Harlan points out, though, this reworking of 
pragmatism is warranted. Rorty is simply looking for answers to present problems in 
Dewey: as a philosopher committed to historicist approaches and the linguistic tum, 
Rorty is attempting to navigate his pragmatist boat around the postmodemist buoys that 
dot the intellectual waters in contemporary times. 
192 Rorty, "Preface," in Philosophy and Social Hope, xiii.
193 Ibid., xiii.
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It is for these reasons that I believe the time has now come to mediate (in true 
pragmatist spirit) the either/or polemic surrounding Rorty's pragmatism. I assert that, 
historical inaccuracies aside, Rorty has some very important things to say about 
pragmatism, and philosophy in general. Although classical pragmatism can be described 
and defined in a general way (as shown above), with unifying tenets that bind Peirce, 
James, and Dewey, the tenets themselves allow room for Rorty. While it can be conceded 
that there is "something" behind the meaning of pragmatism, this "something" is not so 
specific as to clearly defme who is to be included and excluded from the club. One would 
be hard-pressed to illustrate the pragmatist virtues of, say, Hegel or Thomas Aquinas, but 
placing Rorty within the tradition is not as hard to do. Hence, Rorty exhibits enough of 
the fundamental qualities ofthe pragmatist spirit to qualify as such. 
The more contentious qualities of Rorty's pragmatism, as I believe, represent a 
twenty-first century type of pragmatism, making use of all the new conceptual tools 
unavailable to the early pragmatists. Rorty's use of new conceptual tools, though, fuels 
challenges that he is nothing more than a postmodemist who is under the delusion of 
being a pragmatist. To address these charges, I wish to examine the origins of Rorty's 
pragmatism briefly, then conclude with a discussion on the pragmatist emphasis on 
pluralism and how it shows that there is room for Rorty within the tradition. In so doing, I 
hope to show how and why a new perspective is in order from which to view Rorty and 
the pragmatist tradition. 
Rorty's Pragmatism: A Defense 
Like many of Rorty's positions, his 'linguistic tum' represents a radical step for 
pragmatist philosophy. To many, Rorty's linguistically-based pragmatism looks a lot like 
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the doctrines of many of the postmodemist intellectuals that came onto the scene during 
the 1960s and 70s. Whereas Rorty's predecessors invested heavily in experience as a test 
of knowledge, he felt that the time had come to do away with the outdated and 
problematic epistemological tool. 194 He asserts that experience carries with it a variety of 
foundationalist implications that James and Dewey did not necessarily consider. 195 It is in 
this context that Rorty moves away from experience to an entirely linguistically-based 
epistemology. However, to many scholars of classical pragmatism, this move sweeps 
away the very core of the pragmatist attitude with it. Rorty maintains that this move is 
entirely consistent with pragmatists' forms of inquiry. Could this be, though, a veil to 
disguise his postmodemist tendencies?196 Although his linguistic pragmatism makes use 
of the conceptual tools most often associated with the deconstructionists, Rorty employs 
several intellectual approaches that prevent him from "going all the way." 
One mechanism that keeps Rorty from actualizing a postmodemist position is his 
use of simple, non-technical language. Unlike many postmodemists, Rorty's vocabulary 
does not take on a condescending tone that serves to vex the reader. As Christopher 
Duncan observes "for the most part, Rorty does not hide behind the obfuscatory jargon of 
his postmodem counterparts thereby making his insurgent radicalism and honest 
194 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 315. 
195 For a discussion on the foundationa1ist implications of James's and Dewey's emphasis on 
experience, see Koopman, "Language is a Form of Experience: Reconciling Classical Pragmatism and 
Neopragmatism," in Transactions ofthe Charles Sanders Peirce Society 43, no. 4 (2007): 694-727. 
196 Postmodernism as an intellectual category is well worn. It has been used in so many capacities 
and contexts that its meaning is nearly unintelligible. Indeed, Rorty himself is quite aware of the status of 
the term: "The word 'postmodemism' has been rendered almost meaningless by being used to mean so 
many different things. If you read a random dozen cout of the thousands of books whose titles contain the 
word 'postmodem,' you will encounter at least half a dozen widely differing definitions of that adjective. I 
have often urged that we would be better offwithout it-that word is simply too fuzzy to convey anything." 
See Rorty, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Postmodemism," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 262. 
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approach simultaneously refreshing, accessible, daunting, and tendentious.,,197 
Furthermore, Rorty is never so cavalier as to reduce knowledge to brute power, systems 
of dominance, or underlying currents of discourse. Rather, knowledge is a conversation 
that has been unfolding throughout human history. In so doing, he avoids the tendency 
among postmodernists to "mock all norms.,,198 That is, while Rorty deconstructs the 
epistemological traditions of Western philosophy, his proclaimed efforts toward the 
edification of philosophy and his commitment to democratic liberalism illustrate creative 
responses to intellectual and social problems of today. 
This brings up an important aspect ofRorty's philosophy that serves to demarcate 
his philosophy from postmodern literary criticism, while simultaneously illustrating his 
pragmatist commitments: meliorism. Too often, Rorty's linguistically-based pragmatism 
serves to overshadow his meliorism, which some believe to be a central feature of 
pragmatism. 199 Koopman underscores the centrality of meliorism when observing that 
"Rorty's pragmatism expresses the hope that we can make a difference between a world 
sustained by our values and a world to which our values are irrelevant. Rorty places 
pragmatism in the service of me1iorism's enabling mood.,,2oo Indeed, it is Rorty's 
proactive me1iorism that separates his philosophy from that of his postmodernist 
counterparts. It being the case that he holds out for the possibility of social betterment 
should be a key indicator ofhis anti-postmodernist position. 
197 Christopher Duncan, "A Question for Rorty," in The Review of Politics 66, no. 3 (Summer 
2004): 385-413, at 388. 
198 Bernstein, "The Resurgence ofPragmatism," 839. 
199 For an important essay on the importance of Rorty's meliorism in relation to Dewey's and 
Foucault's social philosophy, see James Marshall, "On What We May Hope: Rorty on Dewey and 
Foucault," in Michael A. Peters and Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr., eds., Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and 
Politics (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 79-100. 
200 Koopman, "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Hope," 110-1. 
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Rorty's meliorism is most apparent in his emphasis on the beneficial nature of 
democracy in human society. It is here where Rorty's writings are shot through with an 
alert and immediate sense of the need for a philosophy of social hope, aimed at "a utopia 
in which moral identity of every human being is constituted in large part, though 
obviously not exclusively, by his or her sense ofparticipation in a democratic society.,,2ol 
If Rorty's meliorism is compared with Foucault's vision of democratic society, then the 
difference becomes quite apparent. Rorty describes Foucault's vision of America as "a 
disciplinary society, dominated by an odious ethos of 'liberal individualism', an ethos 
which produces racism, sexism, consumerism, and Republican presidents.,,202 More 
broadly, Rorty observes that postmodemists tend to "participate in...the 'America Sucks 
Sweepstakes.' Participants in this event compete to find better, bitterer ways of 
describing the United States. They see our country as embodying everything that is 
wrong with the post-Enlightenment West.,,203 Where these criticisms fall short, Rorty 
believes, is in their lack of a call ''to formulate a legislative program, to join a political 
movement, or to share in a national hope.,,204 That is, postmodemists espouse what is 
wrong without providing an outline on how to fix it. Rorty, on the other hand, keeps as an 
object of affirmation the possibility of democracy becoming realized and does not 
succumb to impotent implications ofpostmodemist criticisms. 
201 Rorty, "Globalization, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope," in Philosophy and Social 
Hope,238. 
202 Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 4. 
203 Ibid., 4. Not all observes agree with Rorty's patriotic nationalism. This aspect of Rorty's 
thought comes out most explicitly in Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998). Raymond Geuss argues that this text represents "a step too far." Geuss believes that "the very idea 
that the United States was "special" has always seemed to me patently absurd, and the idea that in its 
present, any of its past, or any of its likely future configurations it is in any way exemplary, a form ofgross 
narcissistic self-deception which was not transformed into something laudable by virtue of being embedded 
in a highly sophisticated theory which purported to show that ethnocentrism was in a philosophically deep 
sense unavoidable." See Geuss, "Richard Rorty at Princeton," 97. 
204 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 8. 
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Thus, Rorty's commitment to the ameliorative effects ofdemocracy in human life 
stands as one of the most explicit features abating postmodernist charges and illustrating 
his pragmatist credentials. It is in his meliorism that one finds a profound concern for 
social hope and democracy that is absent in the garden variety ofpostmodernist literature. 
Indeed, this aspect of Rorty's philosophy most resembles the classical pragmatist's 
emphasis on possibility. In this respect, Rorty never gives up the possibility of a utopian 
democracy coming to fruition in the future, which a postmodernist would never give 
consent to. It appears that although Rorty makes use ofthe linguistic tools made available 
by the practitioners of literary criticism, he maintains only the more beneficial elements 
without bringing on the full force ofpostmodern criticisms. 
Now that the charges of postmodernism have been addressed, other questions 
concerning the validity of Rorty's pragmatism can now be examined. The question of 
belonging is one that perplexes many observers. Rorty's critics who argue that his views 
"are so weird as to be merely frivolous,,,205 question the alignment with such a rich 
tradition that, for all intents and purposes, does not appear to suit his training in analytic 
philosophy. Any fruitful explanation, then, of why Rorty chose to align himself with the 
pragmatist tradition will need to take account of the important nuances in Rorty's 
background that lead him to the adopt pragmatism. Such an explanation, I believe, will 
show that Rorty's "pragmatist tum" is less of conversion than it is a manifestation of 
certain aspects of his experiences as a child of leftist parents and his training in 
university. 
One aspect that cannot be overlooked is Rorty's background and how it shaped 
his intellectual growth. For some, Rorty's leftist upbringing and subsequent 
205 Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 5. 
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disillusionment with analytic philosophy during the early years of his career may have 
predisposed Rorty to take the "pragmatist tum." To the former, Rorty recalls that "1 grew 
up knowing that all decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at least socialists.. .r knew that 
poor people would always be oppressed until capitalism was overcome... So, at age 12, 1 
knew that the point of being human was to spend one's life fighting social injustice."zo6 
An integral figure that would have a profound influence on Rorty was Leon Trotsky. 
Although Rorty's parents were supporters of the Communist movement in the United 
States in the 1920s, they soon broke ties when the atrocities Stalin was inflicting within 
the Soviet Union began to become apparent. For the Rortys and other like-minded New 
York intellectuals, Trotsky represented a humanist figure who believed that human rights 
and social justice should never be sacrificed for ideological purposes.Z07 Trotsky inspired 
a sense 0 f value in democratic virtues in the fight against fascism during the 1930s and 
40s, which Rorty saw as a real threat to the future of the United States.Z08 From this, 
Rorty learned the intrinsic worth of social justice in a world that faced the immanent 
threat of total destruction. The imperative to ameliorate cruelty in the public sphere was a 
pressing issue with immediate consequences. To be sure, this is consistent with the 
meliorism most effervescent in the pragmatism of James and Dewey, whose own 
philosophies ofsocial hope grew out ofsimilar political concerns. 
206 Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 7. 
207 See Gross's discussion on the impact of Trotsky on the Rorty family in Richard Rorty: The 
Making % an American Philosopher, 50-6. 
08 Cotkin suggests that the specter of fascism throughout Europe in the 1930s and 40s, which 
resulted in the "end of ideology" in the 1950s, influenced Rorty's demarcation between the public and 
private spheres. In such tenuous times, the potential for "radical transformations of the public sphere" 
posed a threat to human life itself Thus, James's notion of the heroic life, where the individual takes hold 
ofthe precariousness of existence, now carried fatal implications. See Cotkin, "William James and Richard 
Rorty: Context and Conversation," 45. 
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A second figure who informed Rorty's concern for social justice and the 
amelioration of suffering was John Dewey. The impact of Dewey on Rorty's philosophy 
does not require restatement, but his influence on Rorty's formulation of social virtues 
should be examined briefly. Rorty observes that 
Dewey thought, as I now do, that there was nothing bigger, more permanent and 
more reliable, behind our sense of moral obligation to those in pain than a certain 
contingent historical phenomenon-the gradual spread of the sense that the pain 
of others matters, regardless of whether they are of the same family, tribe, color, 
religion, nation, or intelligence as oneself.209 
Dewey articulated for young Rorty the rationale behind the need for social justice and 
how it was connected with larger philosophical problems. When a socio-historical 
philosophical perspective is applied to real-world situations, the need becomes apparent 
for a philosophy focused on consequences, not theory. Thus, Rorty's "pragmatist tum" 
can be seen as taking root early in his life. 
Critics of Rorty's "pragmatist tum" are quick to point out that Rorty's training is 
ill analytic philosophy. If one follows the general line that this tum was in fact a 
conversion rather than a manifestation of certain aspects of Rorty's past, then it is indeed 
problematic. Conversion entails trading in one set of convictions and beliefs for another. 
However, upon closer examination, pragmatic concerns are a consistent feature 
throughout Rorty's college experiences as an undergraduate and graduate student at 
Chicago, and as a doctoral student at Yale. Gross reports that Rorty's training took place 
"in departments where, on the whole, analytic philosophy was looked on with 
skepticism.,,21o Although Rorty's master's thesis and doctoral dissertation involved 
analytic topics, he voiced numerous concerns about the dangers of myopic approaches 
209 Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 14.
210 Gross, RichardRorty: The Making ofan American Philosopher, 308.
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which analytic philosophy employed?ll Rorty studied as a PhD candidate at Yale from 
1952 to 1956. During this period at Yale, some of the sentinels of American philosophy 
who kept it alive in the classroom during the moribund period were teaching there. 
Several of these figures include Rulon Wells, John E. Smith, and Rorty's dissertation 
supervisor Paul Weiss. The fact remains, though, that Rorty knowingly and willingly 
went into analytic philosophy. If his heart was with the pragmatists, then why was this 
move ever made? 
An explanation for Rorty's training ill analytic philosophy involves two 
interrelated parts: the dominance of analytic philosophy ill academic discourses and 
economics. For the most part, Rorty's training in analytic philosophy represents more of 
a smart career move than of a fundamental concern for the questions asked by the 
analytics. As shown above, analytic philosophy came to dominate philosophy 
departments in the United States during the post-World War II. As a result, the need for 
more qualified professors to teach the subject increased substantially. Thus, ifone wished 
to gain employment in a philosophy department during the 1950s and 60s, the potential 
candidate would be well served to go into analytic philosophy. The need for economic 
stability, then, can account for Rorty's choosing analytic philosophy as a professional 
field. After all, it is not an outlandish proposition to say that people enter into careers that 
they are less than passionate about for the economic security they provide. A rebel cannot 
be so unless she is well fed. 212 
211 Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making ofan American Philosopher, 308. 
212 Gross argues that "with respect to Rorty's analytic turn, theories emphasizing the strategic 
nature of intellectual life offer a convincing explanation. Rorty was professionally ambitious and realized 
he could not get a job in a top philosophy department-much less tenure-unless he became a participant 
in the analytic enterprise." See Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making ofan American Philosopher, 308. 
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With these considerations m mind, Rorty's "pragmatist tum" appears less a 
conversIon than a reverSIon to a philosophical attitude that informed his more 
fundamental concerns conceived at a young age. For Rorty, from the outset of his 
training, he found analytic philosophy problematic because it operated in such a way as 
to create boundaries which cut off forms of inquiry that were potentially beneficial. z13 
Analytic philosophy operated under a paradigm where only certain questions were asked 
for very specific reasons. By the late 1970s, Rorty had enough. For Rorty, pragmatism 
represented "a break from the demands of analytic paradigmicity-a break from the felt 
sense that what it meant to be a good and serious philosopher was to fashion solutions to 
current disciplinary controversies using technical methods of the day."Z14 Indeed, 
pragmatism spoke to Rorty's genuine concerns for social justice and the applicability of 
philosophy in real life social contexts. 
Combine this reworking with a true affmity for Dewey, and a clearer picture 
begins to emerge of Rorty's self-identification with pragmatism. Rorty appears less 
disingenuous and less discursive in his pragmatic formulations. Some may argue, though, 
that sincerity only does so much. The intellectual climate during the 1960s and 70s period 
meant that Rorty's pragmatism was going to look quite different than James, Dewey, or 
Peirce's pragmatism. Rorty's pragmatism illustrates the training as an analytic 
philosopher, his deep affmity for Dewey and the pragmatic tradition, the impact of 
literary criticism in the humanities during the 1970s, and the Kuhnian revolution. These 
historical contingencies affect Rorty's pragmatism just as a variety of historical 
contingencies affected the early practitioners of pragmatism. This being the case, I hope 
213 Rorty, "Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Laws ofPhysics," in Philosophy and Social Hope, 178. 
214 Gross, "Richard RaTty's Pragmatism," 120. 
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to show in Chapter 4 that Rorty maintains enough family resemblances to appropriately 
qualify as a pragmatist, and that the tradition which champions pluralism is large enough 
to include him. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION: A QUESTION OF PLURALISM 
What, then, can be made of Rorty and the pragmatist tradition? Two points will serve 
well to summarize. On one hand, Rorty has done more than anyone to revive pragmatism. 
His pragmatism reasserts many of the central aims of the early forerunners of the 
movement. Rorty's criticism of representationalist epistemologies, his socialization of 
knowledge, and his emphasis on both fallibilism and possibility clearly keep in line with 
the pragmatist tradition. By bringing these pragmatist methods and concerns back into to 
the fold, Rorty reinvigorated a rich philosophical tradition, thus enabling it to be put to 
use for inquiry into present problems. More practically, Rorty's philosophy has important 
things to say in an age dominated by deconstructionists whose record appears less 
edifying than destructive to moral and social structures. What makes Rorty so refreshing 
in the present intellectual climate is his willingness to maintain an object of affirmation 
that operates in company with his criticism. Rorty's notion of a "post-philosophical 
culture," in which traditional intellectual constraints will give way to playful ironism and 
a more democratic society, is a source of hope in times when all the effects of global 
capitalism are being manifested, terror is the new warfare, and fewer and fewer 
intellectual discourses seek to address concrete social realities. Rorty's meliorism is his 
object of affirmation that shows a profound difference between himself and the more 
radical of the contemporary deconstructionists. It is in this historically-specific concern 
for the "problems of men" that Rorty best shows his pragmatist credentials. Thus, Rorty 
represents a strong intellectual voice deserving of our attention. 
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On the other hand, Rorty's pragmatism is admittedly more radical in several ways 
that the classical tradition cannot allow for. His strict antifoundationalism and linguistic-
based pragmatism goes farther than the early pragmatists would be willing to go. Taken 
to its logical end, Rorty's skepticism towards all foundations results in the loss of any 
base on which to form consensus. To be sure, none of the early pragmatists would have 
endorsed a position that entailed such a loss. Hence, Rorty's less than rigorous 
methodology and less than precise accounting of his predecessors' thought cannot be 
excused entirely. Although Harlan and others believe that all is fair in an intellectual 
world where concepts like "objectivity," "authorial intention," and ''the agent-knower," 
are subject to increasing scrutiny, a minimum standard can exist to judge historical 
accuracy.215 Credible scholars have valid arguments and grievances with Rorty's version 
of the pragmatist tradition that deserve attention. If the principle criterion of a good 
intellectual historian is to treat her or his subject with fairness, then Rorty can be seen as 
going only half way. Rather than taking the good with the bad, Rorty seems to only want 
to take what is most useful and leave behind everything else. Couple this criticism with 
those of Sleeper, Edel, Gouinlock, and Haack, and it can be appropriately concluded that 
Rorty has some formidable charges against him. However, the argument here is 
215 This assertion cuts to the heart of a debate that continues to rage in intellectual history. 
Intellectual historians like· David Harlan argue that literary criticism has shown that the practice of 
historical inquiry is susceptible to postmodemist-type critique. This is particularly troubling to historians, in 
that history is a form of inquiry that depends upon the "agent-knower" to achieve "authorial intentions" 
which are aimed at a degree of "objective" knowledge. When all of these concepts are thrown into 
question, one wonders how history (or anthropology, sociology, English, philosophy, and all of the 
humanities) as a discipline can continue to proceed, business as usual. An epistemological crisis of this sort 
appears insurmountable. However, as Joyce Appleby observes, "Language, purpose, power, free choice, 
determinism-these are heady words, redolent with meaning and brimming with evocative power that we 
smuggle into codes and embed in myths...The library of human chatter is vast; meanings have been 
catalogued; expressions checked out and lost...lf the poststructuralists are correct that we cannot fathom 
the original meaning of the texts offering us a window on other human experience, we will remain 
imprisoned in the present. Small wonder that historians draw upon their practice of reconstructing the past 
in order to resist the verdict." See Appleby, "One Good Turn Deserves Another," 1332. 
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concerned with the move beyond the either/or nature ofthe controversy, so it is my intent 
to show a possible way ofmoving beyond the Rorty polemic. 
Thinking Beyond the Pragmatist Controversy: Recovering Pluralism 
Strong emphasis is placed on how Rorty deviates from or distorts the pragmatist tradition. 
This point certainly needs no reexamination. It is from this perspective that critics assert 
the impossibility of congruity ever being achieved between Rorty and the early 
pragmatists. To overcome this attitude, the concepts of refinement and pluralism will be 
explored to show how they lead into the possibility of multiple "pragmatisms." To this 
end, it will be argued that if the perspective of disunity is dropped in favor of a position 
that emphasizes pluralism and recognizes the historically-specific contingencies that 
shape all the pragmatist's philosophies, then it will be possible to move beyond the 
controversy. 
On this new perspective, Rorty's pragmatism is one among many in the great 
sweep of the pragmatist tradition. Rorty's is a refined pragmatism, just as Dewey refined 
James's pragmatism, and James refined Peirce's pragmatism. Each pragmatist has had to 
build in and excavate certain features from the tradition so that their pragmatism could 
answer to a variety of socially and historically specific problems. As such, Rorty's 
pragmatism should be recognized as refining the pragmatist position to enable its 
maneuverability in a late-twentieth and early twenty-first century intellectual and social 
context. In so doing, Rorty maintains the essential spirit of the tradition while making it 
consistent with paradigm shifts that have occurred over the long stretch of pragmatism's 
history. 
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As a central feature in the history of pragmatism, pluralism allows Rorty's 
position to be validated as sufficiently pragmatist. For Peirce, a community of diverse 
minds was the only real means to refine knowledge and reach a "fmal opinion." James 
held pluralism to be a crucial philosophical and moral concept. In A Pluralistic Universe, 
James argues that there exists no "fmal word," no "one true perspective." He observes 
that ''the pluralistic view... is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-
form at all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it 
may remain outside ofthe largest combination of it ever made."Z16 In this acquiescence to 
the pluralistic universe, James maintains that mankind can leave its mark through 
strenuous, active creation. For Dewey, pluralism promotes diversity inviewpoints, which 
serves to expand the potentials of human knowledge and discovery. In Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, Dewey argues that "every combination of human forces that adds its own 
contribution of value to life has for that reason its own unique and ultimate worth."Z17 
Indeed, Rorty's emphasis on conversation is implicitly pluralistic. For Rorty, knowledge 
is contingent upon access to a particular language-game, which depends on a confluence 
ofsocial and historical factors that determine the type of conversation taking place. Thus, 
knowledge is not singular, but plural, depending on place and time. A consistent 
emphasis among the early pragmatists, then, was on the value of multiple viewpoints in 
the testing of ideas and the creation ofknowledge. It is this vein that Rorty's voice cannot 
be dismissed wholesale as irrelevant to the pragmatist tradition. 
Taken in the context of this thesis, pluralism can account for changes in the 
complexion of pragmatism that are the natural product of historical time. That IS, 
216 James, A Pluralistic Universe, 20.
217 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 204.
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pluralism is not a historically-specific category; rather pluralism allows for the grouping 
of similar ideas over time and space. Gary Brodsky unpacks this idea by suggesting that 
the differences between Rorty and the early pragmatists are inevitable, but continuity is 
not difficult to locate among them. He observes that "Rorty deals with pragmatism in the 
light of contemporary philosophical developments and among these developments 
Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions looms quite large in Rorty's thought.,,218 Brodsky 
posits further that ''This is as it should be and it can be argued that contemporary 
followers ofthe pragmatists who also appreciate Kuhn's work would accept the thesis on 
the grounds that it preserves as much of pragmatism as is now possible. It might even be 
argued that the pragmatists themselves would have accepted Kuhn's work and modified 
their views in the direction of Rorty's thesis.,,219 It follows, then, that although Rorty's 
pragmatism differs from the historically-specific methods of the early pragmatists, he 
maintains the pragmatist spirit in his inquiries. Rorty is merely synthesizing the 
pragmatic attitude with new conceptual tools available to him. As Brodsky illustrates, it 
is not unfathomable that had such tools been available to, say, James or Dewey, similar 
models may have emerged from these thinkers. It is this sense that Rorty's historical 
misgivings are repaid in his refinement of some of the more problematic aspects of the 
. d··pragmatIc tra ttIon.220 
Rorty's philosophical strength lies in his taking the best and most important tenets 
of the pragmatist tradition, while simultaneously drawing on the powerful theories that 
have "cleaned up" intellectual thinking in our times. It is this sense that we are well 
218 Brodsky, "Rorty's Interpretation ofPragmatism," 329. 
219 Ibid., 329. 
220 For an extended argument on this notion of refinement, see Koopman, "Language is a Form of 
Experience." 
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served to take a look at what Rorty can say about present intellectual troubles. It could be 
argued further that this is a very pragmatic take on Rorty, keeping in line with Peirce's 
and Dewey's notion offallibilism and reconstruction in thought and modes of inquiry. On 
this view, Rorty can be seen as practicing just one ofseveral versions ofpragmatisms that 
originate from the classical tradition. 
Several problems arise, though, when discussing the notions of pluralism and 
multiple pragmatisms. The former is a particularly problematic category. Such a mindset 
runs the risk of infmite regress, ending in unintelligible relativism. Under such a label, 
the line between inclusion and exclusion becomes blurred if not wholly dissolved. As for 
the latter, the notion ofmultiple pragmatisms serves to contradict the notion ofa unified 
tradition. Both charges can be answered with a single reply. The notion of "a" 
pragmatism and multiple pragmatisms is not a contradiction. Nor does pluralism (as 
pertaining to pragmatism) entail relativism. Why? Pragmatism, as a philosophical 
attitude, is set up in such a way as to purport both unity and pluralism. To many 
observers, though, this simply cannot be the case. Such a conclusion is merely the result 
of faulty logic. I would argue that pragmatism is united by a general set ofprinciples, one 
of which is an emphasis on pluralism. So, pragmatism is both inclusive and exclusive. It 
is inclusive in the sense that it champions a wide and diverse range of viewpoints to 
expand the domains of knowledge and possibility. It is exclusive, though, in that it has a 
set of general principles that outline what can and cannot count as pragmatism. On this 
assessment, pragmatism is open to a number of different offshoots of itself (as shown in 
Peirce's form of pragmatism, James's form of pragmatism, Rorty's pragmatism, and so 
on), while maintaining a general theme as to what it espouses to be and do. It is, then, that 
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pragmatism can have a unified body of principles that demarcates itself from, say, 
German Idealism or Logical Positivism, while promoting pluralistic endeavors within 
itself. Thus, because pragmatism champions pluralism, it is able to include multiple 
pragmatisms while not resulting in an all-inclusive relativism. 
Thus, if we view Rorty's pragmatism as one among many, then the controversy 
falls to the wayside. It is no longer identified as an "other" who crashes the pragmatist 
party. Conversely, the intrinsic pluralism that is shot through classical pragmatism allows 
Rorty to practice his own brand of pragmatism, while recognizing it as a part of the 
tradition as a whole. Koopman agrees that it is time for resolution in the ongoing 
"internecine conflicts" in contemporary pragmatist philosophy. In so doing, he reinforces 
this notion ofplural pragmatisms. He argues that rather than viewing scholars of classical 
pragmatism (who he calls "primapragmatists") and the linguistic neopragmatists as 
diametrically opposed, "it is time to consider the possibility of yet another stage in 
pragmatist thought which will combine the best insights of each of its predecessors. This 
would require reinterpreting this intramural debate such that primapragmatism and 
neopragmatism could be seen as two moments in a broader pragmatist sweep.,,221 To do 
so, Koopman urges his readers to rekindle the pragmatist spirit of pluralism, which sees 
pragmatism as "capacious enough to house both of its major moments.,,222 With such a 
perspective, it can be hoped for that Rorty will no longer resemble an intruder as a much 
as a contributing member ofthe "Revival Generation" ofpragmatism. 
221 Koopman, "Language is a Form of Experience," 695. Koopman advances a third version of 
pragmatism that he believes "does justice to both Rorty and Dewey by focusing on experience as a 
temporal field." He argues that by emphasizing the temporality and historicity of experience in James and 
Dewey, while concurrently abetting the foundationalist implications inherent in such an emphasis, "we can 
slowly work our way toward a conception ofexperience that is sufficiently appreciative of the motivations 
behind Rorty's linguistic turn." 710-13. 
222 Ibid., 695. 
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Conclusion 
Where did we come from and where have we arrived? Among the early pragmatists, 
consistencies are equaled by inconsistencies. Peirce was interested in the main with the 
scientific and logical consequences of pragmatism. His concern with the methods of 
inquiry and the outcomes of experimentation illustrate the germinal concepts on which 
James and Dewey would build off of and rework. Moreover, his pragmatism is marked 
by a clarity and eye for detail that is unmatched by James and Dewey. Unlike James and 
Dewey, though, Peirce lived a troubled life and only attained real notoriety after his death 
in 1914. 
More than anyone ofthethree, William James did more to bring pragmatism into 
the public fold. If there was a rock star of American pragmatism, James would be it. His 
approachable prose and rhetorical style, coupled with a concern for everyday issues, 
show why James reached the level of success he did. Dewey represents the coming full 
circle of American pragmatism. His emphasis on the scientific and the social provide a 
clear blend of Peirce and James, but retrofitted to accommodate both a post-Darwin and 
post-World War II world. Dewey also stands as the bridge between contemporary 
pragmatism and classical pragmatism. He was the last of the old guard to fall victim to 
the confluence of social, intellectual, and political forces that pushed pragmatism into 
decline during the 1950s. However, he was also the philosopher neopragmatists looked to 
when they attempted to revive the movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The unifying thread among each ofthe early philosophers was an emphasis on the 
consequences, not causes, of actions, beliefs, knowledge, and experience. For these men, 
causes are the stuff of Descartes and Kant. Their search for causes had proved futile and 
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morally dangerous to the early pragmatists. By the mid-nineteenth century, times had 
changed. The early pragmatists sought to adapt philosophy to the social contexts oftheir 
times. Philosophy had to ''work,'' it had to be able to make a difference, both concretely 
and morally, in a person's life. Still more, philosophy had to be flexible enough to 
incorporate changes as they came. Philosophy no longer had to provide the answers to 
eternal and foundational questions that stood against the everyday, changing ones. 
Rather, philosophy had to bend and flex with the changes if it was going to make a 
difference. Whether or not a difference was achievable was unknowable, but hope lay in 
the possibility for the early pragmatists. So, it can be seen in the philosophies of Peirce, 
James, and Dewey that a firm commitment existed to these sorts ofprinciples in the ways 
they approached philosophy. 
When Richard Rorty rumbled onto the scene in 1979, philosophy in America had 
experienced a generational separation from the classical pragmatists. In that time, much 
had changed and transformed. Socially, the status quo had become challenged during the 
Vietnam War and the Civil Rights movement. Conformity gave way to eccentricity. 
Intellectually, Logical Positivism and the Analytic school had become entrenched in the 
American university. With it, a sense of "rigorism" had taken hold as the guiding 
principle not only in philosophy, but in academia in general. Analytic techniques were 
developed and employed to sharpen knowledge, to cut out the questions not worthy of 
interrogation, and most importantly, to get some answers. Thomas Kuhn's articulation of 
the nature of scientific revolutions and the fallibility of paradigms would prove to be a 
crucial moment in the revival ofpragmatism by Rorty. 
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With the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979, Rorty's 
career as a philosopher and intellectual historian would be given a jump start that sent 
him to the top. This critical history of the origins of philosophical problems in the 
Western tradition harkened back to agendas held by James and Dewey. Rorty's call for a 
return to more tentative and flexible forms ofphilosophical inquiry was a bold maneuver, 
in that analytic philosophy reigned supreme at that time. However, a small minority of 
philosophers and social scientists had grown dissatisfied by the absolutism of the analytic 
methods. The time had come for a change and Rorty (in true pragmatist fashion) called 
into question the very foundations on which philosophy had been built for two thousand 
years. 
Rorty's revival of pragmatism was both positive and negative. In emphasizing the 
antifoundational and anti-essentialist aspects of pragmatism, he also brought back into 
view a rich and valuable philosophical tradition that was thoroughly American. In so 
doing, he brought back the issues of social justice, democratic liberalism, and historicism 
into philosophical discourses that had been abandoned by analytic philosophy. 
However, to scholars ofclassical pragmatism, Rorty was seen as a wolf in sheep's 
clothing. He called himself a pragmatist, but his doctrines and posture spoke otherwise. 
His willingness to cherry pick the history ofpragmatism for bits and pieces that informed 
his theories caused an outrage. Moreover, Rorty's dumping of experience for language 
was seen as removing the heart ofpragmatism. Thus, Rorty served as a polemical figure. 
I have suggested an alternative though. Rorty's pragmatism reflects philosophical, 
social, and historical transformations that serve to distance him from the contexts of his 
pragmatist forefathers. It would seem intuitive that his pragmatism would necessarily 
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look different because ofthese factors. What Rorty has done was to revise and update the 
core doctrines of pragmatism to conform to the challenges of analytic philosophy, the 
loss ofepistemological foundations in the wake ofpostmodem criticism, and the Kuhnian 
revolution. In a sense, then, Rorty has refined pragmatism to better correspond to the 
realities that he faces in a contemporary setting. On my view, this move is entirely 
pragmatic and one that the early pragmatists would probably have endorsed. Although 
Rorty's pragmatism is historically inaccurate, it is of value to our present dilemmas in 
philosophy. Ifwe can somehow regain the sense of plurality that the early pragmatists 
championed, then I believe that the controversy over Rorty will fall to the wayside, and 
his pragmatism can exist as one among many different pragmatisms. 
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